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ABSTRACT
SECULARIZATION and INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
Helicke, James C.
Masters, Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Gülnur Aybet
June 2001
Traditional realist and structural neorealist approaches to international relations
have largely made a "secularization assumption" by approaching states as static givens
without looking at the ways in which states have become constructed as "secular." States'
adoption of secularization differs according to domestic context and often creates
tensions through the reconstruction of "religion." In the Turkish context, the construction
of new politics and an apolitical religious sphere were central elements in the building of
a Turkish nation state. This reconstruction, however, occurred at the particular expense of
non-Muslims in the republic, whose religious difference became reconstructed as national
difference. The purpose of this study is to suggest a constructivist framework for
interpreting secularization, to trace its development in the Turkish state, and to ascertain
its implications for non-Muslims in the republic.
Keywords: International Relations Theory, Religion, Secularization, Secularism, Turkey.
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ÖZET
LAİKLEŞME ve ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER TEORİSİ: TÜRKİYE
Helicke, James C.
Masters, Uluslar arası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Gülnur Aybet
Haziran 2001
Geleneksel realist ve yapısalcı (neorealist) uluslararası ilişkiler yaklaşımları statik
verilenler olarak laikleşme varsayımı'nda bulunmuşlar ve devletlerin nasıl 'laik' olarak
inşa edildiklerini araştırmamışlardır. Devletlerin laikleşmeyi benimsemesi ülkenin iç
ortamına göre değişiklik göstermekte ve dinin yeniden inşası ile gerginlikler
yaramaktadır. Türkıye bağlamında yeni bir siyaset ve apolitik dini alanın inşası Türkiye
milli devletinin kurulmasında temel unsurlar olmuşlardır. Ancak bu yeniden inşa
devletteki müslüman olmayan unsurların aleyhine olmuş, dini farklılıklar milliyet
farklılığı olarak ortaya konmuştur. Bu çalışmanın amacı laikleşmeyı yorumlamak,
Türkiye devleti içindeki gelişimini takip etmek ve devletteki müsülman olmayanlara
etkilerini belirlemek ve konstruktivist bir çerçeve örnermektir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslar arası İlişkiler Teorisi, Din, Laikleşme, Laiklik, Türkiye.
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1INTRODUCTION
How are religion and international relations related? The answer is not a
simple one. Generally, we understand the two to be very separate spheres of life that
have very little to do with one another. Whereas international relations broadly
describes the international behavior of states, religion is usually understood as
something relating to societies, groups, or individuals within a given state. That is,
religion is not generally understood as involving international relations, nor are
international relations usually understood as containing a religious component. They
are, in short, understood as separate and distinct social phenomena.  This separation
and distinction requires a reformulation of the original question: Why then are
religion and international relations not related? The answer to this question is at once
epistemological and derived from the world in which we live.
In epistemological terms, the ways in which we "write" international relations
very often excludes religion from mattering. International relations, as it is
traditionally understood, concerns issues of states in an international system and their
strategic balancing behavior. International relations may even involve economic
aspects. In all of these scenarios, with few exceptions, the state is assumed to be an
important actor. Even in some newer approaches which introduce other actors than
the state (such as non-governmental organizations) the role of the state is
acknowledged  (even if in the future it is subject to change). Thus, the state occupies a
crucial role in how we perceive the world and the way in which we define
international relations. Conversely, religion seems to be something very distinct from
the behavior of states. It is something "personal," "spiritual," and unrelated  to the
2operation of modern states.  In short, the state occupies a fundamental starting point of
international relations in a way that religion does not.
Likewise, the way we understand international relations is largely derived
from the world we live in. The political hegemony of statehood entails that "other
forms of political community have been rendered almost unthinkable."1 Political,
economic, legal and even social relations are defined to a greater extent by states than
by religion. Likewise, a large portion of the world (especially those who write
international relations) live in societies in which state and religion have some sort of
formal separation. The ways in which religion is separated will, of course, vary from
state to state. Nonetheless, a fundamental characteristic of contemporary world
politics (certainly after the nineteenth century) is the significance of the state as a
building block of international relations. In our contemporary world, we more often
attribute power to states than we do to religion.
However, this thesis attempts to provide an alternative answer to the relation
of religion and international relations: Rather than suggesting that religion is
something "different" than the state, I propose that  both modern international
relations and modern religion are both products of state-centric epistemology and
experience.2
Like traditional international relations, I take the state as my point of departure
because of its prominent position at the both domestic and international levels. Unlike
                                                
1 R.B.J. Walker, "The Subject of Security," in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., Critical
Security Studies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 73
2 The meaning of "modern" is a complex notion that has received a great deal of attention in academic
circles. In this thesis, I understand "modern" to be closely linked to attitudes in particular but also
policies  that developed in the post-Enlightenment West  (but have become adopted outside the West as
well) emphasizing change, progress, rationality, and science as positive and universal developments.
By "modern politics" or "modern international relations" I wish to suggest new political arrangements
focused around the nation state and corresponding international system. By "modern religion" I wish to
suggest the development of "religion" as a universal anthropological category being "apolitical" in form
(see chapter 1).
3traditional scholarship, I challenge the "state" both as a given or the only referent
object for international relations.  New approaches to international relations have
challenged the "neutrality" of the state  in terms of both theory and practice both by
suggesting that the way that the state has been conceptually constructed  reflects
certain conceptual biases;3 or by arguing that the existence of a state in some contexts
inherently acts as sources of insecurity for its citizens.4 This thesis will analyze the
neutrality of the state by exploring the way that the construction of the state impacts
religious identity. As such, this analysis indirectly acts as a challenge to the argument
that religious identity is marginal to the study of international relations. It has been
suggested that identity and the state are linked in at least three ways: in affecting
states prospect for survival, the modal character of statehood in the international
system over time and the character of statehood within a given period.5 Additionally,
it is necessary to consider the way that the adoption of statehood is equally
constitutive of identity and the effects of interstate relations on religious identity.
To put the issue in other terms, "being" an actor in the modern international
system means being a state. The adoption of statehood at the international level,
however, involves the expectation to be like other states, to become "functionally
similar" in relations with other states. Thus, the adoption of statehood involves a
reconstruction of identity as a modern state. This oftentimes has implications for
religion by redefining its scope (often as apolitical, spiritual, or private). Religion is
very often separated, subordinated or rewritten in some way in conformity with
                                                
3J. Anne Tickner, "A Critique of Hans Morgenthau's  Principles of Political Realism" in R.C. Art and
R. Jervis, eds. International Politics and Contemporary Issues. (New York: Harper Collins College
Publishers, 1996).
4  K.J. Holsti, "International Relations Theory and Domestic War in the Third World: The Limits of
Relevance," in Stephanie G. Neuman, ed., International Relations Theory and the Third World. (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
4statehood. This process, by which religion is reconstructed as a distinct social sphere
in terms of the state, can be called "secularization."  However, just as statehood is
constructed differently in a variety of contexts, so too will the reconstruction of
religion assume different forms. Moreover, the process of secularization is not simply
a "neutral" process, but has rather has profound implications for existing social
relations.
Thus, this thesis is divided into three chapters:
The first chapter provides a theoretical and conceptual overview of religion
and international relations. It shows how international relations' traditional focus on
the state has excluded religion from mattering and how this reflects a particularly
Western weltanschauung. Despite its Western roots, a secularization norm of
statehood has become an almost universal international governing state identity, albeit
acquiring radically different significance in different contexts.
The second chapter provides an example of  secularization by looking at the
case of Turkey. The Turkish case is interesting for several reasons. First, its historical
experience situates it both within and outside the experiences of the "first" and "third"
worlds. Second,  Turkey's rapid attempt to construct a modern nation state in Western
terms is well documented. Third, Turkey's official identity as "secular" (as evident in
both official discourse and policy) allows one to isolate "secularization" as a distinct
variable. Ultimately, Turkey's particular adoption of statehood and continuous
reorganization of religion and politics show how secularization is neither a static, nor
singular process.
                                                                                                                                           
5 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity and Culture in
National Security," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in
World Politics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
5The final chapter attempts to "deepen" the argument of the second chapter by
shedding light on how the reconstruction of Turkish state identity as secular should
not be understood as a "neutral" process but as necessarily occurring at the expense of
existing social relations. It does this by analyzing the case of non-Muslim religious
groups in Turkey and their experiences of Turkish secularization in the state's
formative period.
6CHAPTER ONE
Religion and International Relations Theory:
The Significance of the State
If throughout our history religion has developed  (to a large extent, with some
other influences at play) a revolution in social values and has given birth by
scissiparity, as it were, to an autonomous world political institutions and
speculations, then surely religion itself will have changed in the process.
[…]Everyone knows that religion was formerly a matter of the group and has
become a matter of the individual. . . . But if we go on to assert that this
change is correlated with the birth of the modern State, the proposition is not
such a commonplace as the previous.6
Introduction
Religion has proven to be an enduring challenge for social sciences. This is
perhaps quite unsurprising because social sciences have often based themselves in
positivist, rationalist and secular assumptions, which have largely assumed that
religion would remain a marginal social phenomenon. The marginality of religion has
certainly been the case for the discipline of international relations. To an important
extent, religion (and identity, more generally) has been considered marginal to the
way that international relations operates, particularly under the dominance of
traditional realism and structural neorealism. International relations have been defined
as relations between states in material (non-ideational) terms. Religion, largely
lacking a significant causal mechanism for states at the international level, has
generally been dismissed as a significant focus of study in traditional scholarship.
                                                
6 Louis Dumont in Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in
Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 27 -28
7Recent scholarship has nonetheless witnessed a renewed interest in religion. A
variety of scholars have, each in his/ her own way, directly challenged the proposition
that religion would remain an insignificant or marginal social phenomenon unworthy
of academic study.7 As insightful as some of these approaches may be, they prove
conceptually problematic. From the perspective of international relations scholarship,
these approaches'  particular focuses on "society" (or in the case of Huntington,
"civilizations") are analytically distinct from international relations' traditional
emphases on the "state" or relations between states, rendering these approaches
difficult to apply conceptually to international relations scholarship.
Moreover, the approaches mentioned above largely suggest  a similar
paradigm, which suggests  (1.) an initial, prototypical religious society, followed by
(2.) a secular society imported from the West, especially under the auspices of
Colonialism and/or the Cold world, and finally (3.) a religious resurgence entailing
either a new religious society or some sort of modern/ pre-modern synthesis. Mark
Juergensmeyer's assertion that
 [t]he new world order that is replacing the biploar powers of the old Cold War
is characterized not only by the rise of new economic forces, a crumbling of
old empires, and the discrediting of communism, but also by the resurgence of
parochial identities based on ethnic and religious allegiances8
 is characteristic of a larger trend in international relations scholarship. In other words,
the most common way of dealing  with international relations' traditional neglect of
identity issues such as religion (both by religiously sympathetic and secularly minded
scholars) has been simply to "squeeze" such issues into traditional scholarship. A very
common argument has been that whereas religion did not matter previously, in the
                                                
7 See for example, Gilles Kepel,  The Revenge of God, The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and
Judaism in the Modern World (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994);
Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations" Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993). Mark
Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993).
8post-Cold War era it will play an increasingly significant role.9 Another approach,
such as John Esposito and John Voll imply, suggests that theories which took
secularism for granted were to an important extent "wrong" about the way they
described the world. Religion rather than disappearing as prominent theories suggest
has reemerged as a force of strong social significance relevant to understanding the
contemporary world.10 Both approaches (that of Juergensmeyer and that of Esposito)
imply a rather simplistic interpretation of the role of religion in society: at any given
time, religion either matters or it does not.
However, such simplistic categorization is problematic because neither
"religion" nor its lack has enjoyed complete hegemony over state or society at any
given time. In other words, "secularization" should not be perceived as an all or
nothing phenomenon, something that simplistically be proven or disproven. In fact,
religion and secularism (the terms that is often used to describe religion's absence
from politics), rather than being understood as dichotomous and opposing social
phenomenon, are part of larger and similar social processes related to the building of
modern states and its construction of modern identity.  Similarly, religion has not
"reemerged" in the post-Cold war era,  but has in fact always occupied a position
alongside the state, albeit in complex and changing ways. Indeed, as will be discussed
below, the fact that all states have developed  religious policies albeit quite diverse
ones suggests that religion, far from being simply "marginal" has in fact always been
a matter of state concern. My contention is precisely that the building of modern
states involves the simultaneous construction of separated spheres of politics and
                                                                                                                                           
8 Mark Juergensmeyer, op cit., , p. 1
9 See also Carsten Bagge Laustsen and Ole Waever, "In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects
for Securitization," Millenium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 29, no. 3 (2000),   p. 705.
10 John Esposito and John Voll, "Islam and the West: Muslim Voices of Dialogue." Millenium, vol. 29,
no. 3 (2000),  p. 614
9religion. Thus, in contrast to theories suggesting religion as a sphere inherently
divorced from the state, I argue that the construction of the modern state both
necessitates and is contingent upon the construction of a religious sphere framed in
terms of the state.
Moreover, the attempt to "squeeze" religion into existing international
relations scholarship, particularly that of neorealist persuasion, does not in fact
expand our understanding of international relations, but rather subjects religion to an
existing paradigm which makes important assumptions of the role of religion, politics,
and the state.  This is analogous to Keith Krause and Michael Williams' distinction
between "broadening" versus "deepening" the definition of security studies. Simply
"broadening" international relations to include new issues (such as the environment or
religious conflict) does not in itself "deepen" our understanding of what constitutes
international relations or what international relations are, which would involve
expanding such understanding to include other levels of analysis. Thus, it is necessary
to "deepen" our understanding of what we understand international relations to be by
examining the way that religion has been traditionally excluded as an appropriate
referent for international relations scholarship.
In sum, I will argue that the development of modern statehood is inherently
related to developments in religion, as we shall later see in the example of the Turkish
state. The construction of the modern state has involved the construction of a religious
sphere framed in terms of the modern state. I do not wish to suggest that religious
space or religion is simply a product of the modern state, but rather that the
construction of modern politics and religion coincide with the construction of a state-
centric social order. At the same time, there is tendency in international relations
scholarship to conceptualize the state as strictly  "political" without recognizing the
10
implications of such a development for religious identity. Accordingly, a common
argument has emphasized that religion does not matter for the (political) state, without
considering the reason for its "lack of significance". To put the issue in different
terms, the construction of the state as represented in traditional international relations
scholarship, rather than being divorced from religion, has in fact espoused an identity
politics with profound implications for religion. Yet, it is important to recognize that
the secularization of states (or as Waltz prefers, their "functional similarity") should
not be perceived as an objective, inevitable or singular process since understandings
of the religious and the political have been framed differently within different states
based on domestic context. Thus, a certain paradox is to be observed: on the one hand,
states have almost universally adopted notions of  "religious" and "political" in the
process of state-building often radically transforming traditional social organization;
on the other hand, states' definitions of religious and political and especially the lines
that distinguish them vary so significantly that a singular relationship between them
cannot be discerned.
Problematizing the State as a Level of Analysis in International Relations
Scholarship
In traditional international relations scholarship, the "state" has prevailed as
analytically distinct, and-- indeed-- the appropriate level of analysis for understanding
international relations. International relations scholarship's focus on and
conceptualizations of the state have profoundly affected the study of religion and
international relations in several ways.
Religion has largely been assumed simply not to matter for international
relations. Hans Morgenthau, a foundational thinker in the field, has explicitly assumed
11
that "religious" issues remain separate from the study of international relations.
Indeed, he argues that "religious man" should never be confused with "political man"
who constantly strives for power.11 For Morgenthau, politics must be regarded "as an
autonomous sphere of action and [understood] apart from other spheres" including
religion.12 Not only is "political man" separate from, for example, "moral man " or
"religious man,"13 there is an "ineluctable tension between the moral command the
requirements of successful political action."14 Thus, any attempt to consider them
together subjects both to confusion.
Though less explicit than Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz likewise suggests that
religion, as an identity issue, is a marginal issue for international relations. 15 For
Waltz, the particular composition of individual states matters less for international
relations than the composition of the international system. In contrast to the
hierarchical organization of domestic politics, entailing specification of distinct roles
and functions, international politics is inherently anarchic in its composition of similar
units (states) without a single overarching organizational principle, causing all states
to focus efforts on their primary aim: survival. Thus, Waltz concludes that
competitive international anarchic structure at the level of the international system
forces states to become functionally similar and unitary actors. In other words,
whatever difference there may be within states at a societal level such as religion
simply do not matter for international relations because, at an international level,
states are forced to deal with similar threats and strategic concerns. Likewise, Stephen
                                                
11 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1985), p. 16
12 Ibid, p. 5
13 Ibid, p. 15
14 Ibid, p. 12
15 Kenneth Waltz, Man the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1959).
12
Walt-- who even goes beyond Waltz's insistence on structures to include some
ideational "threats" such as ethnic conflict-- argues that the expansion of international
relations, particularly security studies, to include new issues rather than states and
their situations of war, destroys the coherence of the discipline.16
Similarly, traditional emphasis on material forces has excluded religion from
mattering for international relations among states.  For Waltz, structures and units are
defined in material (non-ideational) terms. Such a definition,  however, lends itself to
a variety of criticisms, such as Alexander Wendt's argument that  anarchy by itself
does not directly cause or define international relations, but rather what matters is the
social structure of anarchy-- the meaning that has been endowed to anarchy through
practice. 17 Regardless of the accuracy or inaccuracy of Waltz's descriptive portrayal
of the international system and the behavior of states in such a system, such an
approach contains profound implications for the study of religion. Foremost, by
defining structure and unit in material terms, ideational and other non-material forces
including religion are inherently excluded from mattering for international relations.
If international anarchy, material forces, and the balancing activities of states are what
matter for international relations, the necessary implication for religion is that it
simply is not important.
Moreover, religion is particularly excluded from mattering for international
relations because, as a consequence of the modern construction of religion, religion
lacks a direct causal relationship motivating state behavior in the international system.
According to a definition such as Stephen Walt's, religion only matters if it affects the
behavior of the state in the international system. If religion does not provide such a
                                                
16 Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35
no. 2 (June 1991), p 213
17 Alexander Wendt, "Constructing World Politics", International Security, vol. 20 (1995), pp. 77- 78
13
causal link motivating state behavior, it is simply regarded as insignificant for
international relations. In other words, by focusing on states and the international
system as the only legitimate referent objects of study (such as in the ongoing security
studies debate), all other referents of study (from individual to society to religion) are
either excluded as illegitimate foci of study or considered in terms of their
significance for the state. As Keith Krause and Michael Williams point out,
neorealism "rests on a claims regarding the appropriate reference objects of security
that both insulates it from seriously engaging alternative formulations and forces the
latter [new approaches] to be judged on neorealism's terms."18  In essence, any
conceptualization of religion from a neorealist perspective (even a reformulated one)
necessarily implies that religion should be interpreted in terms of its implication for
the state, such as how religion affects state behavior. Neorealism-- because of its
state-centric starting point--can never ask what the implications of the state or the
international system are for religion. Traditional realism suffers from a similar state
bias. According to Hans Morgenthau, whereas the individual may be bound by moral
or religious considerations, the state cannot let religious or moral concerns "get in the
way of successful political action."19 As critical theorists remind us, regarding the
state and its behavior in static, given, and "objective" terms, also legitimizes its
activities.20
In sum, it is possible to say that traditional international relations scholarship
has had at least three implications for the study of religion. First, religion and other
                                                                                                                                           
18 Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and
Methods," Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 40 no. 2 (October 1996), p. 235
19 Hans Morgenthau, op cit., p. 12
20 See, for example, Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory" in  Andrew Linklater et al eds., Theories of
International Relations (London: MacMillan, 1996).
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issues of identity have largely been assumed to be marginal to what international
relations are. Second,  emphasis on the state has excluded religion as a legitimate
referent of analysis and, where considered, subordinated it to the state. Finally, focus
on material forces has implied that religion simply does not matter. Thus neorealists
make what can be termed a "secularization assumption". From this perspective,
religion-- if it should be studied at all-- is less a social force than something benign
and insignificant, resting at the level of individuals and-- in its extreme-- small
groups, but never politics. But this leads to more difficult questions: foremost, what is
religion and what is secularization?
Studying and Defining Religion and Politics
Religion remains one of the most elusive-- and slippery-- objects of social
study. Post-Enlightenment intellectual discourse has often drawn a dichotomy
between "religious" thought and secular "scientific" or knowledge. According to
Williams, a distinction between faith and knowledge is rooted in liberal ideology,
which has hoped that "[b]y limiting discourse to the positive, phenomenal world. . .
politics and society could be freed from the conflict which emerged from non-
empirical claims of individual conviction."21  In effect,  such a dichotomy has often
entailed either the subjugation of either religious thought to scientific knowledge or
vice-versa (thus, entailing conflict between the two) or, on occasion, religious thought
and  science are formulated as equally relevant, but distinct sources of knowledge.
Either outcome has generally entailed some difficulty in bringing the two together.
                                                
21 Michael C. Williams, "Identity and the Politics of Security," European Journal of International
Relations, Vol. 4 no. 3 (June 1998), p. 211
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It is therefore unsurprising that intellectuals have been unable to develop a
widely acceptable definition of religion.  A wide variety of definitions flourish.
Theological definitions largely emphasize the spiritual or "irrational" component of
religious belief and practice, as distinct from the non-religious aspects of life. Such
definitions include Friedrich Schleiermacher's definition of religion as the "feeling of
absolute dependence," Rudolf Otto's emphasis on religion as "awe, a unique blend of
fear and fascination before the divine" or Mircea Eliade's focus on religion as
embodied in sacred space and time.22  Unsurprisingly, these definitions prove difficult
from the perspective of the social sciences, particularly because of their divorce from
social context and emphasis on aspects of life that are in some way "different" from
other aspects of social reality or, even by their own definition, counted as "other-
worldly."
Social scientific definitions of religion also proliferate. Roy Wallis and Steve
Bruce, for example, define religion as
actions, beliefs, and institutions predicated upon the assumption of the
existence of either supernatural entities with powers of agency, or impersonal
powers or processes possessed of moral purpose, which have the capacity to
set the conditions of, or to intervene in, human affairs. Further the central
claims to the operation of such entities or impersonal powers are either not
susceptible to, or are systematically protected from, refutation.23
It should be noted that the authors propose this definition as substantive in the sense
that it defines religion, not it terms of what it does, but in terms of what it is. The
problem with such a definition, particularly in my attempt to locate religion in a social
space, is that religion is defined in rather vacuous terms: this definition supposes that
religion can in some way be analyzed in and of itself without referent to the social
                                                
22 Winston L. King, "Religion" in Mircea Eliade, ed., The Encyclopedia of Religion vol. 12 (New York,
MacMillan: 1987), pp. 283-285
16
context in which religious actions, beliefs, or institutions operate. Yet, ironically, the
definition, in its reference to "actions, beliefs, and institutions" acting within "human
affairs",  suggests that religion is not simply something that can be defined in and of
itself, but something that is acted out in a social space.
Another type of definition is more "functional" in nature in aiming to define
what religion does. For example, Clifford Geertz defines religion as
(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and
long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of
a general order of existence and (4)clothing these conceptions with such an
aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.24
For Geertz, human beings are constantly challenged by the problem of chaos.
Religion in this context provides human beings and society a means to deal with the
hardships of life.
Numerous other definitions of religion also flourish.  A recent piece of
international relations scholarship that argued for the need to reintegrate religion in
international relations scholarship similarly emphasized that religion necessarily
contains faith and distinguishes between immanent/transcendent and sacred/profane.25
 In general, what all of these approaches-- both theological and scientific--
share in common is, foremost, the idea that there is distinct and universal social
phenomenon called "religion" that can be clearly discerned from other aspects of
social reality. Religion, in these terms, is separate or distinct from other social
phenomena: It is something "spiritual" or "sacred" that is framed in opposition to what
is either "temporal," "secular" or "profane".  Regardless of the exact meaning of these
terms, their existence implies a dichotomous distinction, which, as numerous authors
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have pointed out, is rooted in Western categories.26 Not only do Western religious and
secular knowledge make similar assumptions about the world, but they do so because
modern international relations, the state, and religion have common roots.27
This distinction is, at initial level, rooted in a theistic form of belief that
distinguishes "a transcendent deity and all else. . . creator and his creation. . . God and
man." 28  At a second level, Western Christianity-- in particular-- has translated these
ideas into two distinct levels of social reality: the temporal and the spiritual or secular
and ecclesiastic. Ultimately, the very notion of "religion" has a very specific history.
As Talal Asad points out, "religion"-- far from being an objective scientific category--
is in fact the product of a specific history, which he suggests is rooted in Western
Christianity, deeming a universal definition of religion impossible.29  In other words,
the very attempt to define religion is rooted in developments in Western religious,
social, and political thought. That is, both Western religious and secular discourses
are derived from a similar social environment. Thus, the difference between them is
not as great as sometimes supposed.
In particular, the way that "religion" has been formulated reflects
developments in the Post-Reformation West's separation of religion from power.
Thus, attempts to define religion in general terms, specifically the universal attempts
cited above utilizing dichotomies of religious/ temporal, largely reflect political and
religious concepts rooted in the West. Indeed, these definitions suggest that there is
something called religion, a "spiritual" realm that can in some way be distinguished
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(January 2000), pp. 206- 45; Scott M. Thomas, "Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously:
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from other aspects of social reality, particularly political concepts.  The most
significant and common embodiment of this distinction involves the idea that  there
are two distinct aspects of social life: political and religious. What is important, for
this discussion, is not so much how these terms can be objectively defined, as the idea
that, both at the level of theory and practice,  the two spheres can be discerned  as
distinct aspects of social life. The relation between politics and religion will vary
significantly (from blurred boundaries in some contexts, to absolute separation in
others), but it becomes increasingly common to accept the idea that the two can, at
least analytically, be referred to distinctly.
The implicit implication of such a distinction is the idea that religion needs to
be separated from politics. According to Scott M. Thomas, such a conceptualization
reflects the "Westphalian presumption" that
when religion is brought into international public life it causes intolerance,
war, devastation, political upheaval, and even the collapse of the international
order. . . the modern state, the privatisation of religion, and the secularisation
of politics arose to limit religion's domestic influence, minimise the effects of
religious disagreement and end the bloody and destructive role of religion in
international relations.30
In similar terms, Laustsen and Waever promote "an approach that singles out the
distinctly religious about religion" by not confusing it with (political) ideology.31
Accordingly, they argue that the securitization  of religion (an act politicization)32
entails "impoverishing it. By using religion for political gains one denies the
transcendence of the divine call."33 That is, Laustsen and Waever's approach assumes
that religion is necessarily and inherently divorced from politics. In their view, true
                                                                                                                                           
29 Talal Asad, op cit., p. 29
30 Scott M. Thomas, op cit., p. 819
31 Laustsen and  Waever, op cit., p. 725 (emphasis added).
32 Ibid, p. 719
33 Ibid, p. 726
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religion has no political component. However, such a view, as I have argued, is rooted
in developments in the West.
Thus, at an initial level, the issue of applying religious and political ideas to
the non-West appears as an epistemological problem: an attempt to use Western
phenomena and understanding to explain the non-Western world. Thus, a fundamental
problem arises when one attempts to apply social categories, such as religion and
politics to non-Western contexts. For example, Bernard Lewis portrays the Islamic
politico-religious system in very different terms:
we in the Western world, nurtured in the Western tradition. . . tend to make a
natural error and assume that the religion means the same for Muslims as it
has meant in the Western world. . . a section or compartment of life reserved
for certain matters, and separate, or at least separable, from other
compartments of life. . . That is not so in the Islamic world. . . .In classical
Islam there was no distinction between Church and state. […]Throughout the
history of Christendom there have been two powers: God and Caesar,
represented in this world by sacerdotium and regnum, or, in modern terms,
church and state. They may be associated, they may [be] separated; they may
be in harmony, they may be in conflict; one may dominate, the other may
dominate; one may interfere, the other may protest, as we are now learning
again. But always there are two. . . . In pre-westernized Islam, there were not
two powers but one, and the question of separation, therefore, could not arise.
The distinction between church and state, so deeply rooted in Christendom,
did not exist in Islam, and in classical Arabic, as well as in other languages
which derive their intellectual and political vocabulary from classical Arabic,
there were no pairs of words corresponding to spiritual and temporal, lay and
ecclesiastical, religious and secular. It was not until the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, and then under the influence of Western ideas and
institutions, that new words were found, first in Turkish and then in Arabic, to
express the idea of secular.34
I do find difficulty in Lewis's suggestion that Christianity inherently espouses
secularism, as an anachronistic interpretation of both Christianity and secularism.35
                                                
34 Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp.
2-3
35 Indeed, although the idea of "two swords" existed in the medieval Church, both swords found their
legitimacy in religious terms. Byzantine Christianity, in which the state subsumes the Church, also
represents a distinct understanding of Christian political thought. Likewise, Christian political
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Nonetheless, this passage demonstrates, at least at a theoretical level, how two taken-
for-granted aspects of social reality in the West (religion and politics) may be
perceived in completely different terms in a different context. In particular, there may
not be two categories of religion and politics, but a singular "religio-political" social
reality encompassing both, both conceptually and practically.  Thus, the attempt to
distinguish the two may be characterized by tension, as is often the case in Islamic
contexts.
It is interesting to note that recent international relations scholarship has made
similar emphasis by challenging neo-realist theories emphasis on the similarity of
units and universal international structure.36  In particular, scholars have argued that it
is necessary to problematize the state as a simplistic given,37 as indeed third world
states' "lack of stateness" in Western terms38 is often characterized by threats of
internal disintegration. Thus, the application of Western processes (state-building and
secularization) and institutions (state, religion, and politics) to the non-West are
understood as being inherently problematic.
Thus, at an initial, purely "epistemological" level, the problem of religion and
politics appears as an issue of historicity39 or cultural variation by implying an a
priori understanding of the way that the social world operates: in secular political
terms and religious terms. That is, an argument along these lines might criticize the
study of Church-State (or religion and politics) relations by suggesting that such a
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36 K.J. Holsti, "International Relations Theory and Domestic War in the Third World: The Limits of
Relevance," in Stephanie G. Neuman, ed., International Relations Theory and the Third World (New
York: St. Martin's, 1998), p. 105
37 Ibid, p. 109
38Ayoob, Mohammed , The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and
the International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 4
39 See, for example, Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of
Knowledge (New York: Harvest Books, 1936).
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dichotomy is inherently prone to bias by assuming that there are spheres of social
reality that should in broad terms confirm to the distinction between Church and State.
For example, Jeff Haynes suggests that the universal application of Western social
categories is problematic because it tends to force one to perceive social reality, not in
terms of the society an sich, but--inaccurately-- in terms of the West:
when we think of Church-State relations we tend to assume a single
relationship between two clearly distinct, unitary and solidly but separately
institutionalized entities. In this implicit model built into the conceptualization
of the religio-political nexus there is one State and one Church; both entities'
jurisdictional boundaries need to be carefully delineated. […] In sum, the
conventional concept of State-Church relations is rooted in prevailing Western
conceptions of the power of State of necessity being constrained by forces in
society, including those of religion.40
Thus, Haynes argues that the study of state-church relations is inherently biased by
bringing with it assumptions about the nature of religion and politics in society.
Accordingly, if our analysis concerns Church-State relations, it is nearly certain that
our analysis will find social phenomena that distinguish Church and State as empirical
givens, regardless if such a distinction should be drawn.
Approaches such as those of Lewis and Haynes, which demonstrate the
epistemological biases of concepts such as religion and politics provide an initial starting
point for our analysis. In particular, such approaches allows us to understand that both
secularization and neorealist theories make similar assumptions about the nature,
character, and appearance of the state by suggesting that all states will become
essentially the same.  Indeed, both secularization and neo-realist theories reflect an
understanding of (religious) identity and politics that is rooted in Western attempts to
divorce religion from the public level of states.41 The difference is rooted in the level
of analysis: Whereas Waltz is interested in the international system, secularization
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theory examines the domestic level of states. Wallis and Bruce define secularization as
the "diminution of the social significance of religion."42 This significance is
diminished through processes of social differentiation, societalization, and
rationalization.43 These processes (as expanded in Wallis and Bruce's further analysis)
suggest a positivist framework in which modern states, in the process of state-building
(or modernization as sociologists refer), undergo similar linear development and
become increasingly secular in character. To put this another way, identity
(specifically religious identity) should become increasingly distinguished from the
political realm of the state.  This, in turn, would seem to confirm Waltz's notion of the
similarity of states and lack of significance of identity at a public or international level
along the lines of Western liberal politics. That is, both theories can easily overlook a
variety of historical contexts by squeezing different societies into one positivist model
beginning in a singular notion of pre-modern state and society and culminating in a
singular modern one, more or less resembling Waltz's neutral, functionally similar
state. For example, Moyser, while acknowledging "some variations around this basic
pattern"44 --not differences among patterns themselves-- nonetheless suggests a
common, pre-modern relationship between religion, society, and state across the
spectrum:
The traditional, or pre-modern, relationship between religion and politics was
one in which the two were closely integrated, one with the other. Religious
beliefs and practices underpinned and entered into the heart of the political
process, supporting and sustaining the exercise of power. But, by this very
token political concerns also extended throughout the religious sphere, The
two formed, in effect, one co-terminous set of beliefs and actions. It was a
                                                                                                                                           
41 Michael C. Williams, op cit..,   pp. 210-211
42 Roy Wallis and Steve Bruce, op cit., p. 11
43 Ibid, pp. 8-9
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system in which social and political life was touched at virtually all points by
religious considerations.45
Likewise, states are expected to develop into secular modern nation states. In the
process, religion is assumed to become somehow separated from the state. The
problem with such an approach is, as we shall see, less the observation that political
and religious spheres are discernible aspects of social life (as these have become
normalized internationally) than the implicit assumption of the inherence of these two
spheres as transhistorical, universally discernible aspects of social reality.   In other
words, it is simply assumed that ideas of "religion" and "politics" (or church and state
as they are often called) can be discerned across a broad spectrum of societies as
objective and static social criteria without also understanding the ways in which each
has been relationally constructed vis-à-vis the other, reflecting both a specific social
arrangement and a specific history of thought rooted in the West.
Nonetheless, an epistemological approach provides only a partial
understanding of the significance of religion and politics vis-à-vis modern statehood.
For example Haynes and Lewis's arguments that religion and politics do not
accurately conform to non-Western experience only partially explains religion and
modern international relations by recognizing the differences of Western and non-
Western experiences of religion. Thus, both correctly criticize the application of
Western social categories to non-Western contexts and illustrate the ways that non-
Western societies defy simplistic categorization of church and state. However,  both
approaches-- similar to the approaches they criticize-- run the risk of essentialization
of religion and politics by suggesting that the non-West is inherently different from
the West. For example, Haynes concludes that
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In their specific cultural setting and social significance, the tension and the
debate over Church-State relations are uniquely Western phenomena. . .
Overleaded with Western cultural history, these two concepts cannot easily be
translated into non-Christian terminologies."46
In similar terms, Lewis suggests that
the very notion of a secular jurisdiction and authority. . .  is seen as an impiety.
. . the ultimate betrayal of Islam. The righting of this wrong is the principal
aim of Islamic revolutionaries and. . . fundamentalists.47
In particular, both authors ignore the ways in which ideas of religion and politics have
become normatively adopted in different societies. That is, both fail to accommodate
the myriad ways in which religion and politics have become important components of
the modern world.  Despite the fact it may acquire a very different meaning in a
different context, the construction of modern states has often entailed some attempt to
redefine the role of religion.  Religion and politics, therefore, should not be simply
defined in static terms, but in terms of social change. That is, although there are
problems in "translating" religion and politics into a different context, this does not
mean that states will not try to translate them. In other words, both Lewis and Haynes
make the common mistake of largely ignoring the possibility of social change through
the construction of spheres of religion and politics. Although these spheres, similar to
Haynes argument, will vary significantly across the board, in recent times the
existence of such spheres has become an almost universal international norm. Both
religion and state have become common means of organizing social reality even if
they are both subjected to challenge by "religious fundamentalists" or do not confirm
strictly the West's definitions of these terms.
Religion may not exist in "objective" terms as Haynes and Lewis point out,
but it is often constructed by states and becomes equally "real". Similar to Laustsen
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and Waever's argument with regard to security, I argue that religion and politics are
self-referential practices:  each acquires their definitions by being referred to as such,
i.e., through practice.48 In other words, it is not simply an issue if "religion" or
"politics" can be defined adequately or absolutely, but rather it is equally necessary to
consider the ways in which these spheres have also been constructed in the state-
building process.  More importantly, what are the consequences of states
reconstructing and, in some cases, even creating social spheres called "religion" and
"politics"? As we shall see, different states define religion in very different terms,
rendering a static definition of religion nearly impossible. This thesis, thus, suggests
that religion-- rather than being understood as a static and traditional component of
social life-- is oftentimes something very new, which is reconstructed in the state
building process and is related to but distinct from another social sphere called
politics.
Toward a Constructivist Understanding of Secularization
Another difficulty with the approaches outlined above (such as those of
Juergensmeyer, Esposito and Huntington) is that they largely exclusive focus on
domestic variables to the exclusion of the larger context in which states operate
(international system). Huntington certainly does not simply examine individual states
as his interest concerns civilizational identity across states. Nonetheless, the
motivating factors for his study are (supposed)  preexistent religio-cultural formations
that are rooted within states and societies at a local (non-international systematic)
level. Haynes, while comparing states, examines differences within states that
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challenge a simplistic understanding of secularization. In other words, these
approaches share in a common a focus on "bottom-up" mechanisms (developments
rooted within states and societies that in some way affect international behavior or
identity) and largely ignore "top-down" factors, which start at the level of
international system and affect local identity and behavior. Roland Robertson
correctly points out that while domestic variables cannot be ignored, a major impetus
for religious and sociocultural phenomena is global in character.49 Thus, while I am
not suggesting that the approaches described are completely wrong, they only
understand half of the complete picture: Although many of aspects of secularization at
first glance appear to be intra-societal, it is equally necessary to the global systematic
context in which socioreligious phenomena occur.50 Moreover, rather than seeing
"secularization" as a material process that occurs uniquely and specifically within
individual states, it is more promising to understand the ways in which individual
states have adopted secularization, both in terms of similarity and difference, across a
wide spectrum of states.
Therefore, in order to examine both the domestic and international aspects of
secularization, I will consider particular instances of secularization as a diffused
international norm. Peter Katzenstein defines a norm as "collective expectations for
the proper behavior of actors with a given identity."51 From the perspective of the
state, norms encourage states to act in a way similar to other states either by
constituting a new state identity or by regulating state's existing identity and
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behavior.52 Similarly, I define secularization as the attempt to construct a sperate
social sphere called religion generally distinguishable from a state's  political sphere.
Within individual states, the ways in which political and religious spheres will be
distinguished will vary significantly, but the existence of two spheres as separate
social phenomena has become nearly universally accepted (with a few notable
exceptions). At the international level, the divorce of religion from international
behavior would, in general, confirm Hans Morgenthau's idea of a political sphere
separate from other aspects of life and Waltz's idea of the similarity of states in the
international system.  Thus, whereas Waltz's and Morgenthau's descriptive portrayal
of states in the international system is not necessarily wrong, the underlying
conceptual explanations for such behavior as attributed by realist theories are
fundamentally flawed53 by considering states and system as static givens and failing
to recognize the ways in which both system and states have been socially constructed
vis-à-vis each other.
Whereas realist interpretations of international relations assume the character
of the secular character of the state in given terms, I argue that it is necessary to
consider the way that states have become constructed as "secular", that is, as
developing concepts of a religious sphere separated from other aspects of social order.
In terms of neo-realism, states are understood as acquiring a separate life in the
international system from that of state's domestic political structure or identity.54 The
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development of secular states,  however, is not without implications for other levels of
analysis. The idea that the modern state acquires legitimacy, not in religious terms,
but more commonly through "secular" appeals (such as popular sovereignty, nation,
etc.) implies a relative loss of power of religious authority vis-à-vis the state. Despite
the fact that such subordination oftentimes proves a source of friction in some
contexts, secularization has become an important norm governing state character and
behavior.
In this context, it is useful to trace the development of secularism in basic
terms. Secularism is largely rooted in European ideas and experiences. Whereas
Catholicism had previously been regarded as an integral component of continental
values, the emergence of the Protestant Reformation,  Protestant appeals to individual
believers, and widespread conflict between Catholics and Protestants (most notably
during the Thirty Years Wars)  increasingly challenged the role of Christian churches
as a means of social cohesion and encouraged the development of religious belief and
identity to become increasingly perceived as a problematic issue at a public level.
Domestically, increasing attempts were made to construct politics and knowledge at a
public level in "empirical," material terms in order to distance society from the
violence that became increasingly associated with faith.55  At an international level, a
new international politics addressed the problem of religious conflict by constructing
a new international politics in which religion would cease to matter between states,
especially through the development of post-Westphalian sovereignty.56  Thus, in
general, it can be said that ideas of separation between religion and politics develop
alongside the evolution of the modern state. Indeed, "the [re]invention of religion, as a
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set of privately held doctrines or beliefs, was necessary for the rise of the modern state
as well as the development of modern international society".57
However, the development of secularism in a European context does not in
and of itself explain how and why this norm has been adopted by other states,
particularly those outside of a European context. There is not one simplistic reason
why secularization policies and identities have been adopted. But in general, the
adoption of state constraints to act a certain way. As Roland Robertson points out
participation  . . . in the world system on the basis of globewide norms
concerning statehood also involves the prescription that states should be
basically secular.[…] the modern global system is highly secular in character,
a secularity which is strongly reinforced by the perception of the secularity of
the global economy. 58
In other words, Robertson suggests that secularization is not just one of many norms,
but is an essential and defining aspect of international society. 59
However, simply approaching secularization as a widely diffused
international norm only partially explains the widespread secularization of states. That
is, by biasing the norm that "works,"60 there is a tendency to overpredict the impact of
an international norm on a given state, especially by not looking at domestic factors.
From the perspective of the secularization norm, it is important to recognize that
secularization is not simply an all or nothing phenomenon.  Indeed, some domestic
phenomena that may be coded as proof of secularization may in fact predate the
secularization process.61 To put this another way, the secularization norm cannot be
regarded as being adopted "merely because state behavior is observed to be consistent
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with an existing international norm"62 Rather, "international norms must be
empowered in the national arena, that is, they must change the interests and
preferences of some domestic agent"63 -- for our purpose: the state.
States, however, do not simply adopt or refuse international norms in absolute
or dichotomous terms, but rather adopt norms in accordance with their domestic
context. Thus, different states will adopt norms differently. Andrew Cortell and James
Davis, moreover, suggest the domestic salience of a norm as a crucial concept in
understanding how norms take root at the domestic level. Several factors contribute to
the domestic salience of a norm, including cultural match, national political rhetoric,
material interests of domestic actors, domestic political institutions and socializing
forces. Accordingly, it is possible to hypothesize that these factors will all shape the
way in which secularization is adopted within the given domestic context of a state.
In these terms, a constructivist approach to secularization will have two
primary-- and occasionally opposite-- consequences for the appearance of
secularization within a given state. First, as Robertson points out, the participation of
states in an international system necessarily encourages secularization from the "top-
down". Secondly,  by considering domestic structures and salience, we understand
that "secularization" as diffused from the level of international norm to its adoption by
individual states will differ significantly according to domestic context. Particularly,
in cases in which religion retains a valuable public function,64 the divorce of religion
from public affairs is less likely to occur.  To simplify, there is a dialectical
relationship between domestic context and the international norm, the form largely
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determining the degree to which the latter resonates within the state. Such a
conceptualization of secularization allows one to refute the "inevitability" of
secularization as Brown warns is necessary,65 at the same time recognizing a
"seemingly general trend whereby societies around the world have gradually moved
away from being focused around the sacred and the numinous. […and] a certain loss
of power and authority of religion in society . . . "66
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CHAPTER TWO
State, Politics, and Religion in the Turkish Republic: An Overview
Introduction
Secularization, as it developed Western Europe, was a gradual process
coinciding with the growth of the modern state and involving the reordering of
religion  (particularly, its separation from politics). The secularization of states has
also become an important feature of the modern international system: The expectation
that states become functionally similar at the international level also implies the
reconstruction of the domestic level and reordering of religion. However, just as
statehood is adopted differently across a variety of contexts, states will adopt the norm
of secularization differently in terms of their domestic context.
The Turkish case is interesting for several reasons. Foremost, Turkish
secularization coincides with the effort to transform the Ottoman Empire, which
featured a strong "religious" (i.e., communal)67 component, into the modern Turkish
nation state. Secularization in the Turkish context is, therefore, closely related to
(modern) statehood. Not only is secularization used to construct a new Turkish state
identity in contrast to the Ottoman empire, but also Turkish secularism becomes an
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integral part of Turkey's identity as a state.  The Turkish state's approach to
secularization  has involved the construction of spheres of religion and politics,
which-- independent of each other-- nonetheless are both derived from (i.e., are
aspects of) the Turkish state. Indeed, there is no clear separation between state and
religion as religious institutions largely fall under the state bureaucracy.
Nonetheless,  Turkish secularism is far from a simplistic or static concept.
Both continuity and change have governed Turkish state interpretations of
"secularism." In terms of continuity, the Turkish state has continuously addressed the
issue of fitting a society with a strong Muslim identity into a state that affirms its
existence in other (i.e., secular) terms. Accordingly, state identity with regard to
secularism has become a contested arena,68 gradually modifying the bounds of
religion and politics in the Turkish context.   Moreover, religion has always been an
issue of state concern: Not only have the constantly reconstructed bounds of religion
and politics been a crucial issue in defining state identity, but the fact of the state's
operation of Islamic institutions has always maintained public significance as a means
of state identity and policy. In sum, it will be argued that, despite significant changes,
an important theme of Turkish secularism throughout the republic involves the
centrality of the state in legitimating both religious and political life and the state's
denial of "independent" sources of social legitimacy in the practice of either religion
or politics.
                                                                                                                                           
not always clear (especially in the early republican period). Nonetheless, it is a fundamental point of
this chapter that religion and political definition have always been subject to tension.
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The Ottoman Context
The Turkish state was constructed from the remnants of the Ottoman empire.
A number of studies have pointed out  Turkey's myriad links with its Ottoman
predecessor.69  For our purposes, it is important  to mention that the early Turkish
Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire both a strong state tradition and the
question of the role of Muslim communal identity in defining political identity.
 The Ottoman empire was characterized by the presence of a strong state.
According to Ali Kazancigil, the strong and centralized Ottoman state tradition was
relatively unique among Islamic societies.70 Although the Ottoman state was certainly
characterized by a very strong Islamic dimension, the legal role of Islam was often
moderated by the state's more pragmatic concerns.71 Nonetheless, notions of political
and religious were both derived from and intimately connected to the state.
The Ottoman empire had divided itself along communal lines (millet) that
functioned as the locus of identity until the Tanzimat reforms (1840-60) legislated "a
direct and identical relation between the government and each of its citizens".72
During the reigns of the Ottoman Sultans Abudlmecit I (1839-61) and Abdulaziz
(1861-76), the Ottoman state engaged in a series of reforms (Tanzimat) that attempted
to separate religious authority from Ottoman legal institutions. In 1839, the state
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issued an Imperial Rescript, which granted security of life, honor, and property to all
Ottoman citizens and attempted to implement a fair system of military conscription
for all of the various millet.  These reforms culminated in the Hatt-i Humayun, which
promised equal treatment for all communal confessions in the eyes of the state in
matters of education, state employment and justice. This also established mixed
tribunals, reducing the power of regional communal authorities. 73
Nonetheless, as Davison points out, this new restructuring of the relationship
between state and individual by surpassing the role of the millet was implemented
largely "from above". In particular, the large degree of European influence in these
reforms disallowed identification with them at a popular level.74 Muslim "political"
sentiment at a local level continued to hold. By the turn of the century, the Ottoman
empire had become increasingly reduced in size-- with the loss of most of its
European territories. Earlier territorial losses in Europe (such as Greece, Serbia,
Romania, and Bulgaria),  Ottoman losses following the Balkan Wars (with the
establishment of an independent Albania and the formal annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1913) and the ultimate loss of Ottoman lands in
the Middle East to European mandates following the Great War, meant that the
Ottoman Empire became increasingly rooted in Anatolia.
Furthermore, Anatolia had become increasingly Muslim in population,
especially following the massive influx of Muslims to Anatolia from lands under
former Ottoman domination in the midst of European, Christian nationalist
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movements. By 1918, Anatolia was approximately 80% Muslim in composition;
following the War of Independence more than 98%.75
In this context,  a number of new ideologies developed in order to address the
collapse of Ottomanism as a ruling ideology, including pan-Islamism, Turkish
nationalism, Westernism, and pan-Turkism. These are important because they are
representative of the ideas and issues that would face the new Turkish state a few
years later. A number of these movements attempted to understand the links between
Turkish and Muslim identity. For example, writing in 1904 Yusuf Akcura states that
although anyone who professes to be a Turk can be one, Islam would still act as a
unifying factor for Turks "since there are so few non-Muslim Turks. . ."76 Yet, Islam
is in itself insufficient as identity for Turks, therefore requiring that Islam be
subordinated to the Turkish race.77 Thus, Yusuf Akcura regarded Turkishness and
Muslim identity as closely related.
Similarly,  Ziya Gokalp, an important ideologue of the Turkish nationalist
movement,  emphasized social cohesion in terms of the Turkish nation, while leaving
an important, yet an ambiguous role for Islam.78 Like Yusuf Akcura, Gokalp seems to
subordinate Islam to the nation.  Indeed, Gokalp argues that Islamic practice can only
reach its full potential for the Turkish nation, when made specific to it, i.e., by
translating it into Turkish.79 The implication is, of course, a move away from
legitimacy framed in terms of a universal Muslim community. At the same time,
Gokalp also seems to imply religion as an essential element of the nation: "In each
person, one aim, one language, tradition, one religion. . . ./ […] Turkish son, there is
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where your motherland is."80 In any case, religious identity was not regarded as
something "separate" from a Turkish political community, but rather was closely
connected to it.
Thus, it can be said that that Turkish notions of religion in the late Ottoman
Empire and early Republic were closely connected both to state identity and politics.
Thus, although I do not wish to suggest that being Turkish inherently involves Islamic
practice, I would suggest that Muslim and Turkish identities are closely interwoven.
Likewise, the Turkish War of Independence illustrates several ways in which
Turkishness and Islam continued to maintain similar significance. First,  the National
Pact (Misak-i Milli-- 20 January 1920),  which stated the goals of "Turkish"
nationalist forces in the Turkish War of Independence, never makes reference to
"Turks" or a "Turkish nation", but rather to the "Ottoman Muslim majority."81
Second, the Nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal emphasized not the establishment of a
secular Turkish nation-state, but the protection of both Anatolian Muslims and the
Caliphate. For example, confronted by a fetva by the Seyhulislam that the Nationalists
were rebels, the Nationalists had the muftu of Ankara issue a contrary opinion. The
Nationalists also depended on the support of a variety of religious dignitaries at the
local level during the war of independence. 82
The Early Turkish Republic
The attempt to create a modern Turkish nation state from the Ottoman
necessarily involved addressing the burdens of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, an
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important aim of the new state was to distance itself from the burdens of its Ottoman
predecessor, both externally (by distancing itself from Ottoman debt and the
capitulations) and internally (by moving away from Islamic bases of legitimacy for
politics). Founded in 1923, the early Turkish Republic, can be understood as a
reconstruction of existing religious and political legitimacy through the creation of a
new, secular Turkish nation-state. However, the method in which the new republican
state conducted these efforts relied not on the sentiments of existing Muslim
communal identity, but attempted to mold a new political and religious context.
The development of the new Turkish state can be understood in terms of
"nation-building."83 Mustafa Kemal implemented a series of reforms in the 1920s and
1930s designed at the development of a modern Turkish nation-ssecular state modeled
on Western ideas and based on the idea of a unitary nation. Ultimately, the process
involved in constructing a new nation state involved changing a state identity in
which communal affiliation played a formative role to a "modern" state identity based
on the idea of a Turkish nation.
The issue of religion and politics played a crucial role in building the Turkish
nation-state. In one sense, Mustafa Kemal and the founders of the Turkish republic
perceived Islam as a mixed legacy. In pragmatic terms, they recognized the dominant
role of "religion" in Turkish society and religion's role as a source of social cohesion
despite linguistic and ethnic cleavages. On the other hand, they understood the
strength of religion at a popular level as a competing source of legitimacy for the new
nation. Yet it is important to recognize that religion in the early republic was never
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considered something "distinct" or "separate" from the affairs of state. Indeed, its
status as a competing source of legitimacy shows the extent to which religion was
regarded as equally "political" in nature.
The new state however aimed to remove the legitimacy of existing traditional
religious (communal) institutions in Turkey, especially those that acted as a means of
legitimating the Ottoman state and politics. The Ottoman sultanate was deposed in
1922. In 1924, the caliphate was abolished, the seyhul Islam (the highest religious
figure of the state) was eliminated, and  Seriat (sharia) courts and medreses (Islamic
schools) were closed in the same year. Because of their links to the Ottoman past,
Mustafa Kemal understood these as standing in the way of the consolidation of the
new Turkish state.84 Furthermore, Ataturk's reforms closed the Sufi brotherhoods
(tarikat), which served to  link ruling Islamic elite to the rural masses.
Nonetheless, Ataturk's reforms are important because they involve more than
simple destruction of Islamic institutions, but also attempt to forge a new identity
politics as well. Nilufer Gole points out the new Turkish state's attempt to bridge the
disparity of masses and state involved a process of "social engineering". Indeed,
"secularization itself became part of that process of social engineering rather than an
outcome of the process of modernization and societal development."85 In other words,
secularization became both a means and an ends in creating Mustafa Kemal's
envisioned state, religion and politics. That is, secularization was used both as a
means of destroying the legitimacy and identity of the Ottoman system and
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constructing a new state. At the same time, secularism became closely related to
Turkey's identity as a modern state.
Turkish secularization aimed not at simply eliminating Islam, but in
transforming it: ultimately "re-Islamizing" society in a way that would be both
compatible with and support the new Turkish nation state.86 At the same time, the
state's discourse related to its new religious policies emphasized that, far from acting
"against religion", the state's aims were to preserve it. Accordingly, Mustafa Kemal
and the founders of the new state approached the issue of secularism carefully.
Despite Islam no longer serving as state religion since 1928, only in 1937 was the
principle of secularism officially adopted. However, in 1937, Ismet Inonu speaking on
behalf of the state emphasized that this action was intended to protect religion: It was,
in fact, the Ottoman Empire that had abused religion by using it for political aims.
The new Turkish state would no longer subject religion to such "confusion" of
religion and politics.87 The new variety of Islam promulgated by the state stressed the
religious role as one of private conscience, not a means of political legitimacy. At the
same time, however, the Turkish state incorporated all Islamic institutions within it,
rendering religion subservient to the state bureaucracy. In sum, the new state aimed to
reform Islam in order to make it compatible with the goals of a "modern" nation-
state.88
At the same time, the Turkish state redefined politics in a way that would
maintain strict separation from religion. For Mustafa Kemal, the new republic was
                                                
86 Esma Durugonul, Ueber die Reislamisierung in der Tuerkei als sozial-religioese Bewegung unter
besonderer Buruecksichtigun der zwei Jahrzehnte 1970- 1990  (Frankfurt, a.M.: Peter Lang Verlag,
1995).
87 Istar B. Tarhanli, Musluman Toplum, "Laik" Devlet: Turkiye'de Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi (Istanbul:
Afa, 1993), p. 19
88 Sencer Ayata, "Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey," The Middle East
Journal, 50, 1 (Winter 1996), p. 41
41
framed in opposition to the personal rule of the Sultan in the Ottoman Empire.89 The
most important aim of the state involved elevating people to the level of
contemporary civilization, i.e., molding the populate into a modern citizenry. Thus,
Mustafa Kemal understood the role of the state not as appealing to an aggregation of
interests but as embodying a singular truth understood in rational scientific terms,90
framed in large part in reaction to religion. Thus, the development of a secular state
identity was defined by state elites, not by civil societal agitation.91
Thus, a fundamental project in the construction of the Turkish nation state
involved the construction of new and separate religious and political spheres, both of
which found their roots in the state. However, in eliminating mass Islamic institutions,
the new Turkish republic lacked an effective means of linking of the masses to the
state in political terms as well. As Metin Heper points out: "What remained of the
Islamic state was virtually eliminated, and was replaced by a notion of completely
secular state. The consequence was an omnipresent state in the absence of a politically
influential civil society, let alone social groups as intermediary structures."92
Although Islamic identity continued to hold sway for a large portion of the population
at the popular and rural, level, groups dedicated to the enactment of Islamic reforms
lacked all resources that might enable Islam to mobilize the masses. The squashing of
the Sheik Said Rebellion (1925), the removal of Islam's status as state religion, and
the closing of the Liberal Party (Serbest Firka) because of provocation involving the
Menemen incident in 1930, served to reinforce the idea that the new state would serve
as the only source of both political and religious legitimacy.
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Nonetheless, the idea that state would implement "true" definitions of both
religion and politics for the populace, rather than by the populace involved a tension,
which was only partially solved by substituting the idea of populace (volk) with that
of nation. Nationalism, thus, would replace the traditional public (political) role of
religion (communal affiliation).93 Mardin's analysis suggests that the state attempted
to create the idea of a Turkish society with values separate from Islam, but which
would ultimately serve as a compliment to state ambitions.94
Education played an important role in the construction of a new Turkish
nation. To a significant extent, the new state policy aiming to disseminate state
identity in secular terms among the masses occurred at the expense of Islamic
institutions.   The ulema, the cleric class which continued to exert significant
influence on Ottoman education, was removed from the republic's education, ensuring
that secular education would transmit state ideology. The significance of these
reforms is evident in their content. Two prominent education themes, the Sun
Language Theory and historical theories stressing the Hittites as early Turks, were
transmitted through education. These theories are important (in their attempt to create
a Turkish ursprache and prehistoric territorial legitimacy) by reconstituting Turkish
history in nationalist terms and by bypassing Ottoman Islamic legitimacy. Similarly,
intellectuals encouraged by the state (such as those belonging to the "Blue Anatolia"
movement) emphasized the ancient history of Turks in terms of Anatolia.95 The same
movement, similarly, also legitimized Turkish secularism, such as by criticizing the
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way in which religion was "stuck" to the state in Ottoman times.96 In similar terms,
newspaper writers were mandated to propagate support for state positions.97
Moreover, the state also attempted to transform popular and folk culture
through education. Education in this sense acted as both a means of creating a new
elite and, by providing education to the masses, as an attempt to narrow the
ideological and identity gap between the new secular elite and Muslim masses. To
these ends, People's Houses (Halk Evleri) were established and literacy campaigns
were engaged. Since the population was largely illiterate, education in the new Latin
alphabet had the effect of drawing a distinct line between old and new identity. That
is, since the populace would be unable to read the material in Ottoman script, the
scales would be offset in terms of secular education,98  assuring popular absorption of
ideas of religion and politics.
Thus, Kemalist political transformation involved a complete social
transformation, originating in the strong, centralized Turkish nation-state. The reforms
of the early republic were, in sum, an attempt to construct a new state legitimacy and
identity that was distinct from the Islamic legitimacy used by the Ottoman state. This
was accomplished by the construction of independent spheres of politics and religion,
which were both subordinated to the Turkish state. The notion of a  "Turkish nation"
was appropriated to similar ends and used as a substitute for the former political role
of religion. Thus, the negative connotation of the "Turk" (understood in the Ottoman
period as a "peasant") encouraged by anti-tribal and anti-national Islamic theology,
was transformed at the level of the state, bureaucratic elite, and mass society.
Accordingly, these reforms attempted to actually change identity "from below"
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though the impetus for which came "from above."  In sum, the construction of the
Turkish nation state and the adoption of secularization were not simply neutral
processes resting at the level of the state, but necessarily affected other levels of
analysis. In particular, the construction of a modern state from the Ottoman empire
involved a radical restructuring of politics and religion and the creation of nationalism
as a political substitute for the Islamic legitimacy of the state.
Following Ataturk's death, Ismet Inonu largely continued his predecessor's
legacy. Inonu understood the state as a realm above politics aimed at guarding the
long-term interest of the community by preserving national unity. 99 Along the lines of
Mustafa Kemal's understanding of politics, Inonu likewise argued that religion was a
particularly sensitive matter as it could be abused for political purposes and disrupt
national unity embodied by the state.100
The Beginning of Multiparty Politics: 1946-60
Despite Inonu's argument that the state should remain above political
considerations, political divergence  and the emergence of a multiparty democratic
system101 involved partially reformulating secularism by redrawing the lines
separating religion and politics.  However, the reign of the Democratic Party in the
1950s must be understood in paradoxical terms: while representing at one level a
societal reaction to the secularization policies implemented by a strong state, at
another level, the DP was characterized by a similarly strong state character, revealing
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the extent to which Turkey's identity as a state had imprinted both political and
religious life.
In 1946, Turkey began an experiment in multiparty politics with the
emergence of the Democratic Party. By 1950, the Democratic Party had
overwhelmingly won in both regional and general elections. Celal Bayar was elected
president in 1950 and appointed Adnan Menderes Prime Minister. To a large degree,
the DP capitalized on a platform based on simultaneously liberal and conservative
approaches to religion. From a liberal perspective, religion did not belong to the
domain of the state. By contrast, the conservatives argued that religion and social
commitment were not incompatible, as religion acted as "social cement of the
cohesion of society."102 In general, the Democratic Party argued that the RPP's
secularization programs were not sensitive to society taken as a whole.
The DP appealed to the religiosity of Turkey (especially the non-urban
constituency from which the DP received a great deal of support) in a variety of ways.
For example, the DP reverted the Islamic call to prayer to Arabic, changed the
enrollment in religious education, established  more  schools for the training of
chaplains and preachers, and increased the level of religious publication.103 It is worth
noting that although the RPP had made certain concessions toward religion in the
final years of its reign (such as permitting  religious instruction in secular schools) the
scope and level of the RPP and DP differed significantly. Whereas the former made
these concession largely in order to ensure a variety of Islam derived in terms of the
state, the latter-- at least in theory-- appealed to an Islam framed in traditional,
conservative, and rural terms.
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Thus, the election of the Democratic Party shows how  Turkish secularism
continued to change according to the context of Turkish society. One way in which it
is possible to understand the success of the Democratic Party is as a social reaction
against the political monopoly of the state elite. Indeed, the RPP remained to a large
extent suspect in the public eyes because of its singular party reign earlier decades.104
As Ergun Ozbudun indicates: "The heterogeneous character of the DP coalition
suggests that the dominant social cleavage of the era was cultural rather than
socioeconomic in nature. The common denominator of the DP supporters was their
opposition to state officials. In this sense, the rise of the DP was a victory of the
periphery over the center".105
Despite this, the Democratic Party -- like the RPP-- preserved similar notions
of the state as the center of Turkish social life. Indeed, in power the DP largely
continued in  the strong state character of its predecessor. For example, the DP rarely
allied itself with civil Islamic organizations. Even more important, despite its appeals
to mass conservatism, the DP largely continued to pursue an Islam of a rational,
"enlightened" variety-- not that of the masses106-- thereby reflecting the continued
domination of a centralized state. In other words, the modern nation state-- not Islam--
persevered as the source of legitimacy for both religion and politics.
The 1960s and 1970s
The 1960s and 1970s represent an important period in the ongoing negotiation
between Turkish state and society on the definition of religion and politics. In
particular, these decades witness the proliferation of a variety of ideologically based
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social and political groups, an important section of which allude to the political role of
religion. Nonetheless, it must be mentioned that the emergence of these groups must
be understood as "new" phenomena, not as simply revering to the past. In particular,
these groups, though aiming to transform the bounds of religion and politics, are
shaped by the bounds of the Turkish state and its identity as secular.
The 1961 constitution was-- in comparison with Turkey's other two
constitutions-- the most liberal. In particular, the constitution included a full bill of
civil liberties that would allow the growth of diverse range of ideological groups
(including Kurdish, Islamist, and communist organizations). Moreover, the
constitution also guaranteed the autonomy of the universities and mass media
providing society with a free means of expression and access to information.
Additionally, a series of checks and balances were initiated (such as the creation of a
second parliamentary chamber and a constitutional court) to ensure that the Grand
National Assembly would not go unchecked.107 In effect, these reforms permitted the
emergence and development of Islamist, Kurdish oriented, leftist, and liberal political
groups.108  Nonetheless, religion continued to be strongly linked to the state. Istar
Tarhanli points out that groups both aiming for greater inroads of Islam in public life
and those arguing for Islam's exclusion ironically shared the idea that Islam must
continue to be linked with the state.109 Thus, the framework of the modern nation-
state persisted as the main transmitter for religion.
Already in the first elections following the coup, the center-right Justice Party-
- the heir to the Democratic Party-- made a strong showing that was second only to
Inonu's RPP. This standing allowed the Justice Party in the first new government
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under the new republic. Indeed, the JP led in the formation of its own government the
following year. These developments are important because they show, in effect, the
resilience of Turkish societal pressure on the state, ultimately leading to center-right
politics being regarded as a legitimate means of political expression. Thus, Turkish
politics shifted in orientation.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that  the role of Islam in politics established
by the efforts of the center-right and the increasing observability of Islamism in
society  also pressured the state bureaucracy to rethink its approach to Islam. Despite
preconceptions  that the 1960s might mean a reversion to pre-1946 secularization
programs, Zurcher indicates that the opposite occurred: "efforts were made to cut the
ground from under the feet of the Islamist current" by dedicating more attention to
religion. Indeed, "[t]o combat religious bigotry, the early governments of the second
republic tried to propagate a modern, rationalist version of Islam. . ."110 particularly
through its monopoly on religious education. That is, the center-right imprinted the
Turkish state with an acknowledgement of the social role of religion.
In addition to the center-right, other political groups reflecting different
worldviews proliferated in the 1960s. The center-right was not the only group
appealing to religious sympathies. During the second part of the decade, Necmettin
Erbakan, a conservative member of the JP, criticized the JP's lack of emphasis on
Islam and founded the religiously oriented National Order Party. Moreover, Alpaslan
Turkes, founder of the Nationalist Action Party, came to emphasize the crucial role of
Islam in national identity.111 It is also interesting to note that both Turkes's and
                                                
110 Erik Zurcher, op cit., p. 259
111 However, it is important to note that not simply "religiously oriented" parties gained popularity
during this period, as indeed the political left also gained a very large number supporters. The success
of these and religious parties reflected an increasingly divided society with an equally splintered
political system.
49
Erbakan's uses of religion, rather than representing traditional or "old" forms of
religion, instead represented new ones. Particularly, Turkes's reformulation of
religion as a component of nationalism differs significantly from that of Ottoman
forms, essentially inverting Islam to the nation. Likewise, Erbakan's participation in
modern politics (in the form of a  modern political party) and his base of legitimacy
(Turkish voters) represent the extent to which the National Order Party was a product
of the modern Turkish state. Indeed, even the party's name (National Order Party)
alludes to a partial adoption of the Turkish state's tropes of political legitimacy
 However, it is worth mentioning that, although the military acted  to close the
NOP in 1971, Erbakan was, nonetheless, able to reenter politics within a short period
of time by establishing the National Salvation Party, which played an important role
in politics throughout the 1970s. It participated in three coalitions, one headed by the
left-leaning  RPP (now led by  Bulent Ecevit) in 1974 and the others led by Demirel
between 1975 and 1977. This participation in popular politics is indicative several
important trends. First, the readiness with which Erbakan was able to reenter the
political scene and his party's acceptance in the coalitions of two diverse parties show
the state's greater acceptance of  discussion regarding the public role of religion. This
does not mean that the state officially opened to religious politics, but it does mean
that religion ceased to be regarded as a "taboo" of political debate. At the same time,
the NSP's representation of Islam had changed as well. Foremost, the NSP's ability to
secure 11.8% of the vote by 1973 shows the popular character of Islamic politics as a
societal movement. Moreover, Erbakan's cooperation with other parties shows that the
NSP was able to find at least some common ground with parties on both sides of the
ideological spectrum. The point is that the NSP (and its successor parties) represented
less a "religious" movement, than a political one: this is especially apparent in the fact
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that not traditional ulema, but engineers dominated the party platform. At the same
time, important changes in the party's constituency (from rural to urban) had occurred:
The state's pursuit of Import Substitution Industrialization resulted in massive urban
migration, as traditionally rural segments of the population left the countryside for
better urban economic opportunities.112 By the 1970s, the NSP based its support not
only on the most traditional rural segment of the population, but in the urban poor: the
highest and least developed parts of the country.113 Islamic conservatism can be
understood as a response to this new urban environment.114
The 1980s and 1990s
The 1980s military intervention represents both continuity and change in the
Kemalist state identity. On the one hand, the military intervention aimed to restore a
strongly centralized and secular Turkish state. On the other hand, the military also
recognized the societal role of Islam and attempted to use religion to support a secular
agenda. However, both external (Turkey's limited economic resources vis-à-vis a
changed world economy) and internal factors (Ozal's politics) challenged the
traditional influence of the state and its relative dominance over society. Throughout
the 1990s, Islamic movements have made important inroads into mainstream Turkish
society. Although movements seeking to Islamize "from above" (i.e., through politics
and the state) have attained some prominence, movements "from below" (i.e., by
constructing a new "civil societal" space) have enjoyed greater success, in a sense,
carving a new growing Islamically conscious space within Turkish society. Both
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movements, it should be mentioned, represent modern phenomena, in that they
address, are framed in response to and accept the bounds constructed by the modern
state.  Moreover, contemporary Turkish Islamism still finds itself in a continuing
dialectic between a secular state and growing Muslim consciousness (although the
boundary is no longer so clear).
Similar to the previous military interventions, the 1980 coup aimed to
reestablish the authority of a strong Turkish state over society and to reassert the
secular nature of the Turkish state. The means by which the constitution aims to
accomplish these goals, however,  differs from earlier attempts by granting the
president increased powers over appointment and the  authority to submit to the
constitutional court suits related to the constitutionality of laws.115 Moreover, the
1982 constitution attempts to maintain the relative strength of the state while alluding
to the increased autonomy of society. For example, although the 1982 constitution
grants associational freedoms (e.g, trade unions) their role is clearly defined by the
state, disallowing them from occupying too great a sphere of political influence.116
Furthermore, the constitution explicitly stipulates secularism as an immutable
and permanent aspect of the Turkish state. Interestingly, however, the constitution
also makes mention of "Turkish historical and moral values,"117 thereby alluding to
the societal significance of Islam in maintaining stability and social cohesion. These
ideas, of course, represent a certain irony, by-- on the one hand-- referring to secular
tenets and --on the other--alluding to religion as a solidifying factor in society.118 This
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allusion to tradition is important because it reflects the impact of societal influence on
the character of the state. Indeed, even Kenan Evren-- the leader of the National
Security Council ruling Turkey after the coup and the first president of the new
republic-- used Quranic verses in order to support his Kemalist understanding of a
modern Turkish state. In a sense, Islam became (re)accepted as part of the nation.
An important development in this regard concerns education. Unlike in
Turkey's previous constitutions, education in "religious culture and ethics" became a
mandatory-- not optional-- course of study in 1982. Although at an initial glance, such
an approach might seem to diminish Turkish secularism, this approach actually aimed
to strengthen the secular state. Indeed, the implementation of religious education
largely aimed to restore religious authority to the state in the face of increasing
numbers of Turkish society attending private religious education, especially that
provided by the Suleymancis.119
Writing in 1990, then Minister of Education Avni Akyol indicated that it was
the obligation of the state to provide education in all regards, including religious.
Religious education should present an informed, tolerant version of "our religion".
"Secularism", he expands, "is not just the separation of spiritual and temporal [din ve
dunya isleri]".120 Rather, "One of the important purposes of secularism is also to
prevent the misuse of religion for special goals and interests."121 Thus, the duty of the
state vis-à-vis religion was that religion not disrupt, but provide "national unity and
oneness." 122
Thus, it can be said that the state's "new" religious policies aimed to maintain
the subordination of religion to the state. The greater inroads of Islam in public
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through the state-- especially through education-- were in Evren's words "connected to
secularism and against fanatic Islamism".123 At the same time, Islam was understood
as a way of fighting communism. Religion provided through the state, therefore was
conceptualized to act as a unifying factor in society "in light of the principle of
secularism by setting up the goal of national solidarity and unification by staying out
of all political ideas and thoughts."124 Religion, therefore, similar to previous
understandings, would still maintain strict separation from politics and be subordinate
to the state. According to this understanding, although religion might support the
state, it could not undermine it, since state legitimacy is not based in religious terms,
but rather religion finds its legitimacy through the state.  Indeed, religion is a
department of  the  state in Turkey.
Antithetically, state and society underwent important changes in the 1980s that
curbed somewhat the state's ability to dominate society. In economic terms, the
increasingly strapped state could no longer afford to continue its hegemony over
Turkish society. The 1980s world economy was a period of massive state-downsizing
and globalization.125 The rapid urbanization that had begun in the previous decades
succeeded in bringing largest portion under the influence of various forms of media.
Indeed, in the post-1983, export-oriented economy, the civil society reached its
greatest autonomy through the increased privatization of television and radio and the
growth of civic organization, such as business associations and civil rights
organizations.126 Thus, both migration of traditional segments of the population to
rural areas, the participation of their children in "modern" higher education, and the
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increasing liberalization of media provided a permissive cause for the expansion of
Islamism, as well as other social ideologies.
Political considerations likewise permitted such development. The Politics of
the Motherland Party (led by Turgut Ozal) reflect both world economic and domestic
political considerations. In particular, both Ozal's "New Vision of Development"
(prepared in 1979 under Demirel) and his "Second Transformation" (1991) argued
against the economic and political domination of the state over society.127 For Ozal,
Islam occupied a crucial role in transforming society. Accordingly, he favored the
development of a more autonomous civil-society, that would transfer some authority
of religion away from state bureaucracy to social groups.
The contemporary period has witnessed a variety of Islamic movements that
have sought to Islamize Turkey both "from above" and "from below". The most
important political movement is the Welfare Party (reconstituted the Virtue Party after
its closure  in 1998), which was until recently the largest political party in Turkey:
receiving 21% of the vote, commanding one-third of the seats in parliament,
controlling the local politics of the largest cities in Turkey, and even coming to power
in coalition with the True Path Party. Various reasons have been cited to explain the
success of the Welfare party, such as its responsiveness and inclusiveness relative to
the secular parties. The Welfare party is important for a variety of reasons. First, the
popularity of Welfare shows that religious issues have continued to play an important
role in Turkish politics. It is worth noting that, despite its fall from power, Welfare
enjoyed some success in its attempt to Islamize society "from above". In particular,
Welfare has managed to gain a great deal of influence within certain ministries (most
notably education) showing Welfare's continued attempt to transform Turkish
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identity. Secondly,  the example of the Welfare party is important because it shows
the continued interplay between secularist and Islamist politics. In particular, despite
its popularity, the Welfare party was closed in 1998  and several of its leaders
(including Erbakan) were banned from further political participation. An important
locus for this development occurred through military pressure, showing that a
secularist interpretation of Turkish state vis-à-vis populism continues to exert
important influence on policy. Moreover, it is possible to argue that this secularist
understanding of Turkish politics also affected Welfare's maneuverablity in power.
For example, Burhanettin Duran suggests that Refah's policies differed significantly
while in opposition and when in power. Indeed,  Erbakan incessantly opposed
Operation Provide Comfort, criticizing Ciller for aiding Western terrorists. While in
power, however, the Welfare party voted to prolong Operation Provide Comfort's
Mandate.128  Finally, since the closure of Welfare, the Virtue party has enjoyed its
greatest success at the local level. One might attribute this success to Welfare/ Virtue's
emphasis on grass-roots politics and as indicative of long-term Islamization occurring
"from below" through the construction of a new civil-societal religious space.
Thus, it is possible to see that the greatest pressure on the Turkish state has
occurred from below. Traditional secularist elites, though still exerting greater
influence within state bureaucracies, no longer command absolute "symbolic capital"
in Turkish society. Rather, the emergence of an "alternative" Islamist elite, favoring
the greater inclusion of Islamic symbols in Turkish public life has been encouraged by
both the increasing autonomy of civil society  and state policies on education:
Graduates of state imam-hatip schools (envisioned as a way of training future
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religious personnel for the state bureaucracy) have enjoyed a wide variety of higher
educational success and entered a number of professional careers. Likewise, despite
official bans against tarikats (religious orders), their numbers have proliferated in
contemporary Turkey. Tarikat members intersect a wide section of society (from rural
to urban, unskilled to professional). Some tarikats (most notably, the Naksibendi
order) have enjoyed close relations to high state positions. Likewise, the existence of
an Islamically-minded civil society no longer entails simply resistance to the state.
Fethullah Gulen's Nurcu movement, in many senses a "modern" tarikat, has avoided a
"political" image, but instead supported state-centric Turkish nationalism, even
enjoying the support of high state leaders (such as Suleyman Demirel and Bulent
Ecevit) against political Islamism and the Welfare-Virtue Party.129 Indeed, legislation
passed in 1991 has amended Article 163 of the Turkish criminal Code, requiring that
only religious organizations calling for force be banned.130
Yet, more traditional interpretations of Turkish secularism also continue to
hold sway. According to such an interpretation, any religious organization that
attempts to exist independent of the state is, in fact, rebelling against the state.
Religion outside the state's official organs is a type of political protest.131 This shows
an interesting way in which the bounds between religion and politics continue to be
connected via the state.  Dogu Ergil presents such an approach by emphasizing that all
"outside the state-administered organization [Diyanet], there exists [no] official and
independent religious organization. . ."132 Accordingly, the very existence of tarikats
runs counter to legitimacy framed in terms of the state: Tarikats' "long-term strategy
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is to train tarikat members to place them in crucial public sector ranks to influence
state politics and, in the future,  to capture it." In this sense, the very existence of a
tarikat implies a political act, a violation of Turkish secularism. Therefore, it is
necessary to implement  "the related articles of the Criminal Code and the
Constitution" which state that  "religion cannot be involved in politics and the
established order of the state cannot be changed in line with religious goals."133
In short, the existence of such groups are perceived as a challenge to a state-centric
social order.  It is noteworthy that the first, second, fifth, sixth, and eleventh of the
National Security Council Recommendations of 28 February 1997, made similar
interpretations of the development  of an Islamically oriented civil society.
In conclusion, I have approached the Turkish secularization  as a reflection of
the idea of the state as the sole source of social legitimacy for religion and politics.
Turkish Secularization in Turkey has entailed the construction of independent spheres
of religion and politics, both of which--somewhat ironically-- attain legitimacy
through the state. Societal pressure and socioeconomic limitations, however, have
also made a deep impact on public life. Accordingly, secularism, its interpretation,
and its implementation remain among the most debated issues of contemporary
Turkey.
Moreover, secularization has not remained a static process. Rather, the bounds
of religion and politics have constantly been reconstructed in the Turkish context.
Thus, not only have the state's adoption of secularization changed according to the
Turkish context, but the creation of a state-centric social order has profoundly
influenced the shape of Islamic groups in Turkey. Groups seeking to Islamize Turkish
society have been forced to address the bounds provided by the Turkish state. This is
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particularly apparent in "political Islamic" groups assuming the form of modern
political parties. Likewise, the attempt to create an Islamic civil society represents the
attempt to carve a space influenced by and apart from the state defined bounds of
religion and politics. Thus, both movements represent modern phenomena in their
reflection of the bounds of modern statehood.
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CHAPTER THREE
Non-Muslims in the Turkish Republic:
Turkish Secularism as an Identity Politics
Introduction
The previous chapter explored the ways in which Turkish secularism, far from
remaining a static or singular political concept, has transformed significantly
throughout the history of the republic. This chapter deepens the previous argument by
exploring the implications of a developing "secular Turkish" state identity for non-
Muslim groups in Turkey. In particular, it focuses on the formative years of Turkish
secularization (the single party period of Turkish politics, 1923- 1945) and shows the
complexity of the state's adoption of the secularization norm. In particular, it
illustrates the transition from a state identity based on communal-religious affiliation
to one along nationalist lines and the complications contained therein.
Secularism is not simply a neutral or objective means of organizing diverse
religious groups under one state structure, but rather involves the practice of a specific
identity politics. That is, the construction of a new "secular Turkish" state identity has
entailed complex processes of inclusion/ exclusion by defining who and -- more
importantly-- who is not "Turkish".  Ironically, religious affiliation has provided an
important means of social cohesion vis-à-vis the Turkish state. As illustrated
previously, the Turkish state's redefinition of the Anatolian Muslim millet into the
Turkish nation, has entailed a process whereby being Muslim has been closely related
to being Turkish. For non-Muslim inhabitants of Anatolia (particularly, Greeks,
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Armenians, and Jews) the opposite has often held true: These groups have often been
excluded from the Turkish nation in political, economic, and social terms. To put the
issue in other terms, the Turkish state transformation of Ottoman Muslim communal
affiliation into the "Turkish nation,"  entailed members of other millets (Armenians,
Jews, and Greeks) either belonged to other nations or were remnants of the Ottoman
system, either of which was contrary to identity as espoused by the modern state.
Thus, despite the status of the Turkish state as "secular," religion has ironically helped
to define exactly who and who is not Turkish.  In sum, it will be argued that the
religious affiliation of non-Muslim communities has commonly been perceived, less
as a matter of simple "spiritual" preference, than as a form of national allegiance vis-
à-vis the secular Turkish state.
Turkish State Identity: Muslims and Non-Muslims
The issue of what defines being "Turkish" has always been an important
question in defining the Turkish state and nation. According to Bernard Lewis,
characteristic of Turkish Islam. . . is the social segregation of the non-Muslim
communities. The Ottoman Empire was tolerant of other religions, in
accordance with Islamic law and tradition, and its Christian and Jewish
subjects lived, on the whole, in peace and security. But they were strictly
segregated from the Muslims, in their own separate communities. Never were
they able to mix freely in Muslim society, as they had once done in Baghdad
and Cairo. . . . One may speak of Christian Arabs-- but a Christian Turk is an
absurdity and a contradiction in terms. . . a non-Muslim in Turkey may be
called a Turkish citizen, but never a Turk. 134
The previous chapter indeed confirms a similar conclusion, by suggesting that Muslim
identity played a formative role in defining the Turkish national struggle and the
question of the role of the Muslim community in defining political identity remained
an important one throughout Turkish republican history.
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Nonetheless, it does not suffice simply to argue that being Turkish means
being Muslim. To do so alludes to an essentialist interpretation of religion and identity
and also overlooks the formative role of the state in defining identity. Turkishness is,
in short, not something essential or absolute, but something constructed in terms of a
new social, political, and religious order, i.e., the modern Turkish nation state.
Likewise, the construction of identity involves more than simple affirmative elements
(Turk as Muslim) but very often requires reference to who one is not, that is, in
distinction to "the other".
For the purpose of this chapter, it will be argued that Turkish state identity has
involved an affirmative component as secular Turkish. This, in turn, has attained its
significance by being framed in reaction to the Ottoman Empire. In other words,  the
Ottoman system is, from the perspective of the modern Turkish state, the Turkish
"Other". Indeed, Turkish state discourse throughout the republic significantly finds its
roots in opposition to all things Ottoman. For example, the Turkish state's emphasis
on a unitary and strong state structure without cleavages among various ethnic or
religious communities is largely rooted against the fragmented Ottoman situation of
its final years which  included both special rights for foreign communities in the
empire (capitulations)  and strong minority activity.  Similarly, the Turkish state's
conceptualization of citizenship (all citizens as possessing an immediate relationship
to the state as "Turks") stands in strong contrast to the Ottoman millet system, in
which the religious community mediated between state and individual. The Turkish
state likewise formulated religion as an apolitical sphere subservient to the state (in
the form of the Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi) in contrast to the Ottoman system,  which--
at least theoretically-- derived legitimacy in religious terms. Ultimately, it is possible
to argue that the entire orientation of the Turkish state as secular, rational, modern and
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Western aimed to situate the new republic in contrast to the perceived "religious",
"irrational", and "oriental" monarchy before it.
The question of non-Muslim minorities posed a significant challenge to the
new Turkish state. The development of a new official identity as Turkish left non-
Muslims resident in Anatolia in a vulnerable situation because of the association of
"Turk" with "Muslim." That is, despite the ongoing construction of Turkish state
identity, older communal forms continued to survive forming the basis for not only
religious identity but containing political overtones. Armenians were not simply
members of a particular church, but were perceived as adherents of another nation.
Thus, the presence of non-Muslims in Turkey was largely perceived as disrupting
what would otherwise be a homogenous "Turkish" state. Thus, unlike Muslims who--
at least theoretically-- became accepted as potential "Turks" regardless of ethnic
background,  non-Muslims resident in Anatolia  became classified as "minorities" or
"foreigners" in Turkey, but never quite Turks.135 This was reinforced by the
autonomous status that would be granted to these minorities, which often became
grounds for resentment or was perceived as an attempt to revert to the Ottoman past.
The Greek and Turkish Exchange of Populations
As a point of departure, it is useful to look at the Greek and Turkish exchange
of populations as representative of Turkish attitudes of national inclusion/ exclusion.
It also provides an initial glimpse into how the Turkish state perceived religious
affiliation.  The "Convention Between Greece and Turkey Concerning the Exchange
of Greek and Turkish Populations" was signed on 23 January 1923 and was ratified in
August of the same year. The Convention called for the compulsory  exchange of
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approximately 1 200 000 Anatolian "Greeks" to Greece and the "repatriation" of  400
000 "Turks" resident in Greece to Turkey.  A significant number of Greeks having
already left Anatolia, the official exchanges began in December 1923 and finished the
following year.
The population exchanges are significant because they reveal the boundaries
of the Turkish state's definition of who would be considered "Turkish". 136Despite the
temptation to think of being Turkish as somehow inherent or intrinsic, the fact that
both Turkish and Greek populations were largely mixed imprinted the cultures of
both. Thus, neither linguistic nor geographic considerations suffice in defining
Turkishness vis-à-vis minorities. Instead, the Convention appealed to religious
affiliation as the defining criteria for exchange. Article 1 of the Convention states that
there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the
Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek
nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory .137
It is interesting to note that the Greeks who would be exchanged were referred to as
"Turkish nationals" showing the extent to which Turkish national identity was still an
identity in flux. Likewise, religion became a defining criterion of who was and was
not Turkish. Indeed, as Bernard Lewis points out, the "Greeks" of Karaman, though
Orthodox in religion, used Turkish as their primary language. Likewise, many
Muslims who spoke other languages than Turkish (such as Greek, Albanian or Serbo-
Croatian) were repatriated to Turkey as "Turks" despite their incompetence in the
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Turkish language.138 It is noteworthy that an exchange of Muslim populations (based
on, for example, linguistic criteria) never became a subject of discussion. Ironically,
religious (communal) affiliation, thus, became a defining instance of the new Turkish
identity.
The only exemptions to the Greek-Turkish exchange of populations involved
the Turks of Western Thrace and the Greeks of Istanbul, who would be able to remain
in their respective traditional places of residence. Yet, Turkey's decision to maintain a
Greek presence in Istanbul was by no means automatic. Ismet Inonu, Turkey's chief
negotiator at Lausanne and later Prime Minister and President, indeed promoted the
total expulsion of all Greeks as "necessary" and "logical."139 Not only the Greeks
were regarded with suspicion. Indeed, all minority groups were regarded as a cause
for national disunity. For example, Dr. Riza Nur, a delegate at Lausanne, addressed
the Turkish Grand National Assembly, commenting on the minority situation in
Turkey:
Now sirs, this minority issue is one of the most important issues and [the legal
status of minorities] have been accepted by the National Pact. When we didn't
want to accept it [at Lausanne] they forced the National Pact. And we
accepted. . .  [At Lausanne] we accepted the exchange of populations, [it will
be done ] by force. There will be no minorities left  [in Anatolia any more],
with the exception of Istanbul. (Protests: What about Armenians?) But friends,
how many Armenians are there? (Protests: What about Jews?) There are thirty
thousand Jews in Istanbul. These people have never been a source of problems
until now. (Protests) As you know, Jews are the kind of people that can be
guided easily. Of course, I would say it would be better if they were non-
existent. . 140
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Thus, for example,  despite significant Jewish participation in the Turkish War for
Independence141, all minorities became conflated and subject to similar prejudice.
Religious identity as political identity continued to characterize the new state to an
important extent.
The Treaty of Lausanne
Similar attitudes were represented at Lausanne in 1923, where the treaty
finalizing the Turkish national struggle and recognizing the new Turkish state was
signed. Turkish representatives at Lausanne particularly strove to consolidate the
sovereignty of the Turkish state "opposing [all] restrictions inimical to the national
development in political, judicial, financial and other matters"142-- especially the
capitulations.143 The issue of minorities was a particularly thorny one and was often
perceived as granting special privileges at the expense of the power of the state.
Indeed, the perseverance of communal structures were regarded as an obstacle to
Turkey's creation of a nation state.  Dr. Riza Nur's suggestion of Turkey's lack of a
homogenous population as the  reason for Ottoman disintegration is representative of
larger Turkish social thought on the issue:
The most important issue has been to save Turkey from the factors which
made Turkey weak, caused rebellions, and allowed Turkey to be used by
foreign states. In other words,[the most important issue] is to make Turkey
homogenously Turkish. It's a difficult and unique job. It was difficult to have
it accepted, even to suggest it. Thank God, they suggested it.144
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Riza Nur's solution, in line with the state's policy in general, involved the
homogenization of the Turkish population.
Despite this, the Turkish delegation consented in articles 37 to 45 of the Treaty
of Lausanne to protect the non-Muslim populations of Turkey (namely, Greeks, Jews,
and Armenians) by not only providing them equal political and social rights, but also
the "right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable,
religious and social institutions, any schools. . . with the right to use their own
language and exercise their own religion therein".145 In addition to the right of a
minority to independently operate religious institutions and schools, the Turkish
authorities also agreed to allow the practice of special family law and personal law for
these minorities, that they not be subjected to Islamic law (seriat). Indeed, article 42
of the Lausanne Treaty stipulates that the "Turkish Government undertakes, as regards
non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status,
measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs
of those minorities."146 Nonetheless, the perception that the new Turkish state would
not have absolute legal authority over all its citizens in the form of a separate civil law
for minorities continued to be regarded with suspicion, as indeed an abridgement of
Turkish sovereignty. Moreover, the perseverance of religio-communal institutions
including the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate despite the abolishment of the Muslim
Caliphate in 1924 was often perceived as "an antithesis to the policy of turkification
and secularization".147
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Secular Reforms and Minorities
In the context of state-building, the development of the Turkish secularism
acts not only as a way of consolidating the new Turkish state and nation, but rather
does so at the expense of  existing social relations. For example, the development of a
secular civil code in Turkey on 17 February 1926 was not simply a way of ensuring
equality under the law for all citizens (as has sometimes been suggested).  Nor did it
simply occur at the expense of Islamic institutions (as outlined in the previous
chapter).  Instead, the adoption of a new civil code acted as a way of centralizing the
authority of the new Turkish state by subjecting all citizens to the same law,
particularly by eliminating the special privileges of minorities. It strengthened and the
centralized the authority of the state. By itself appointing representatives to and
manipulating minority councils, the Turkish state caused the Jewish, Armenian, and
Greek minority groups to renounce their separate legal status as outlined in article 42
of the Lausanne Treaty. 148  According to one source, Greek representatives were
imprisoned for six months until they finally agreed to relinquish their minority
rights.149 Thus, the introduction of secularism consolidated the authority of the
Turkish state by significantly reducing non-Muslim influence.150
Thus, despite the clauses of the Lausanne Treaty aiming to protect minority
communities, the Turkish state consistently aimed to consolidate its power by
including minorities in larger process of secularization and Turkification. Minorities
especially complained that secular reforms threatened their cultural traditions by
forcing integration into an increasingly homogenized Turkish (Muslim) population.151
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The separation of religion and politics proved particularly difficult for
minorities. For example, the institution of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate was
separated from the Orthodox community and its function was reformulated to be
"purely spiritual" in nature in the name of secularization. Other religious communities'
leaders were similarly separated from their religious communities. These measures
had the effect of further diminishing communities' influence vis-à-vis the state by
reformulating their status as "purely spiritual" in nature, that is, as containing no
political authority. In these terms, the 1935 election of a new Patriarch was subject to
strong Turkish state control.  The Jewish community did not even have a Grand Rabbi
between 1931 and 1953. Likewise, both the Armenian and Orthodox Patriarchs were
largely curtailed and subjected to Turkish state approval.  Minority religious
institutions, separated from the heads of religious communities, instead became
subject to Turkish state bureaucracy after a 5 June 1935 legislation (which created the
Vakiflar Genel Mudurlugu). Indeed, the fact that religious communities legally
became the administrators and not the owners of their respective synagogues and
churches,152 shows the extent to which religious legitimacy was subjected to state
control and separated from the communities themselves. Likewise, the confiscation of
eight Armenian Catholic Churches for not adhering to the details of the  legislation
show the extent to which the state subsumed all religious institutions and asserted
authority over them. Interestingly, attempts were even made to "Turkify" minority
religious institutions, such as the creation of a Turkish Orthodox Church.153
Minority education was subject to similar pressure. Schools were increasingly
secularized and Turkified. All schools were nationalized in the early years of the
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republic. Like all schools, religious instruction in minority schools was prohibited
after 1932 in accordance with the ideology of the Kemalist regime.154 Indeed, clergy
members were even banned from even entering schools.
At the same time, schools came under increasing pressure to become
"Turkish". Instruction in the Turkish language was mandated in all schools.
Coinciding with more general efforts encouraging the use of Turkish by the public,155
minority schools often encountered difficulties teaching in other languages. Jewish
education occurred in Turkish, despite the previous use of French in Alliance Israelite
schools. The teaching of Hebrew was also prohibited as being religious in nature.156
Moreover, schools were often placed under the control of non-minority headmasters
and were forced to accept non-minority teachers at terms and wages dictated by the
Turkish state. Greeks, for example, complained that Turkish language examinations,
background checks, and citizenship requirements  were administered in such a way
that many Greek teachers were banned from teaching.157 In effect, simultaneous
policies of secularization and Turkification of education policies weakened minorities
by aiming to eliminate the most unique aspects of their identity (language and
religious community).
Building a "National" Economy
Particularly suspect was the fact that minorities continued to hold a number of
influential Istanbul business positions. Turkish state policies aiming to build a
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"national economy" for the sake of  "economic sovereignty" was often implemented
at the expense of minorities. This was particularly the case because non-Muslims
were regarded as belonging to another nation, i.e., despite secularization, religious
identity continued to carry political overtones.  For example, the "Abandoned
Property Law of 20 April 1922" aimed for the state confiscation of properties whose
owners had fled during wartime-- the majority of whom belonged to wealthy minority
groups. This contributed to the closing of more than 110 important Greek firms and
more than 20 Armenian ones between 1922 and 1923. 158 Ismet Inonu's 1922
comment that "we will not have Armenians and Greeks remaining as the means of
importing corruption and disloyalty into our country"159 shows the extent to which
minorities' economic involvement continued to be held with suspicion.
Likewise, a number of economic nationalization policies  aimed to transfer
leadership from minorities to (Muslim) Turks.  A number of public sector employers
(such as banks or telephone companies) which had traditionally been dominated by
minorities were not only under pressure to hire Muslim Turks, but were often forced
to dismiss minority employees. Public Works Minister Fevzi Bey openly declared:
Companies. . . must engage Turkish employees only. This does not mean that
they can employ all subjects. . . indiscriminately. They must employ Moslem
Turks only.  If the foreign companies do no shortly dismiss their Greek,
Armenian and Jewish servants, I shall be compelled to cancel the privileges
under which they are authorized to function in Turkey.160
This statement is important because it shows the extent to which, despite official non-
discrimination according to the Lausanne treaty, minorities continued to be regarded
as "different" than other Turkish citizens and excluded from Turkish national
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development programs. Their religious background translated as national difference.
Accordingly, minority lawyers were often unable to practice law.161  Drivers could not
renew their licenses. Similar practice severely limited minority involvement in
shipping and railroad. 162 The establishment of state monopolies (such as the alcohol
monopoly in 1926) often occurred at minority expense.
Minorities were especially vulnerable because a number of them held foreign,
not Turkish, citizenship. Thus, despite the fact that most resident "foreigners" had
never resided elsewhere,  citizenship requirements became a common obstacle
preventing many residents from employment. Addressing the Turkish Grand National
Assembly in 1932, the Internal Affairs Minister, legitimated one such piece of
legislation in the following terms:
This law, the law that says some jobs are prohibited to foreigners, has been
implemented in all sovereign states for a long time. And it is called regime
d'etrangers in international law. In other words, it is the law that will bind the
foreigners. We have wanted this for a long time, but the capitulations that
were an obstacle to the future of development of the country prevented this. In
the World War, by unilateral abolishment of the capitulations, some job were
transferred to Turks, but we got the biggest right of this sort in Lausanne. At
Lausanne, we transferred some jobs just to citizens." 163
Thus, by appealing to the sovereignty of the Turkish state and the rights of
citizenship, the Turkish state was able to circumvent concerns over excluding
minorities because of their classification as foreigners.
Turkish Antisemitism
In this context, it is useful to observe the growth of antisemitism in Turkey. In
historical terms, antisemitic occurrences in the Ottoman were relatively rare and,
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where present, generally involved Christian, not Muslim attacks against Jews.164
Accordingly, Jews often enjoyed better social relations both in the late years of the
Ottoman Empire as well as the Republic. For example, Jews more than other minority
groups were able to retain their rights to practice law in the republic.165 Continuing in
a similar tradition, the Turkish state,  even granted asylum and academic position for
34 Jewish professors who had been expelled from the German Nationalist Socialist
regime in 1933.166
Though still relatively rare, the early Turkish republic did observe a number of
antisemitic occurrences. Although I do not wish to suggest that the Turkish state
actively pursued a specifically antisemitic program, it is nonetheless possible to argue
that the new state's emphasis on Turkishness and religious minorities as a "different"
nationacted as a permissive cause in the emergence of Turkish antisemitism. Cevat
Rifat Atilhan, published two antisemitic newspapers, Anadolu and Milli Inkilap.
Although the former was closed, the later was allowed to publish throughout 1934.
Thus, although the state did not necessarily promote such views, it did not necessarily
take actions to counter them-- at a time when the state was actively pursuing an
official identity politics and press censorship was a norm.
At the same time,  articles in Milli Inkilap appealed to the new state's
Turkification and secularization programs and argued that Jews could never become
Turks. For example, one article stated that "we do not even anticipate that they can be
Turkified, nor do we want it. As mud cannot become iron after being put in the oven,
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a Jew cannot become a Turk regardless of what he does."167 This quotation's appeal to
the sense of being Turkish (us) in contrast to being Jewish (them) is particularly
noteworthy and is not so different than the state's own identity policies vis-à-vis
minorities.  In the end, this newspaper's articles incited both an embargo against
Jewish firms  and physical attacks on the Jewish community of Thrace, causing more
than 10 000 Jews to seek refuge in Istanbul on 4 July 1934. 168 Although Turkish state
officials did renounce the violence and prosecute a number of those involved, a
degree of hesitation is to be observed by the Turkish state. For example, then prime
minister Celal Bayar's suggestion that "There is no Jewish problem in our country.
There is no minority problem at all"169 reveals a certain complacency with regard to
policies toward minorities. Other state officials emphasized  that Jews needed to
remain loyal to the state (seeming to imply that they had not been). Another suggested
Jews' lack of assimilation as the actual root of any Turkish' antagonism against them.
170  Moreover, although they did not in the end succeed, laws were presented in the
Turkish Grand National Assembly as late as 1938 curtailing further Jewish
immigration and requiring Jews to learn the Turkish language within one year or be
subject to deportation-- a provision that would have applied not only to new
immigrants but to all Jews.171
The Varlik Vergisi (Income Tax)
During the Second World War, Turkey pursued a policy of neutrality, aiming
to keep out of the war for the sake of maintaining its national sovereignty.
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Nonetheless, Turkey was  adversely affected by the war. Particularly, the threat of a
German invasion with forces on the Greek border s caused great economic hardship in
Turkey by increasing defense expenditures. In addition, some groups actively engaged
in profiteering by hoarding necessary supplies. The 11 November 1942 introduction
of the Varlik Vergisi (Income Tax) sought to address these problems by decreasing
the budget deficits brought on by security spending through the introduction of new
tax money. For this study, the implementation of this tax is more significant. Indeed,
it shows the ways in which religious affiliation continued to be regarded more than
simply a spiritual preference, but as a form of national allegiance from the perspective
of the state. That is, non-Muslims continued to be regarded as "different."
The Varlik Vergisi established different categories of taxation in terms of
religious affiliation. Religion did not  act simply as a "neutral distinction" but actually
determined one's tax bracket, i.e., the amount of money one had to pay was based on
one's religious communal affiliation. By far, the "M" (Muslim) tax bracket paid the
absolute least, despite representing the greatest portion of the population (more than
98% of Anatolia). By contrast, the "G" (gayrimuslim= non-Muslim) tax bracket, the
smallest group representing less than two percent of Anatolia,  assumed the burden of
the tax, paying on average more than ten times that of the "M" group. Indeed, official
records suggest that "wealthy minorities" paid more than 280 000 000 Turkish Lira
out of 315 000 000TL collected in total.172  Thus, despite the state's identity as
secular, this by no means meant the equal treatment of all religious groups. Religion
continued to be a means of social, economic, and political distinction.
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Furthermore, the implementation of the Varlik Vergisi aimed not simply at
promoting the war effort, but rather acted as a means of consolidating the Turkish
nation and strengthening the state vis-à-vis minorities.173 Not only was the tax was
determined arbitrarily by tax councils (composed entirely of Turkish Muslim
members), the taxpayers were unable to appeal it. Taxpayers were, moreover,
required to pay the tax within 15 days with interest for late payment. Two weeks after
the deadline, the individual's property was subject to confiscation for non-payment. If
this did not suffice, the tax payer was then sent to hard labor camps (most notably at
Askale) until the tax was paid off. Because of the severe terms of the tax, the effect
for minorities was disastrous. Foremost, the tax transferred a significant number of
non-Muslim firms to Muslim ownership, reflecting the Turkish state's emphasis on the
building of a "national" economy, by which "national" meant Muslim. At the same
time, the tax had the effect of driving out of the country a significant number of
minorities because they were unable to pay.
Both the ability of the Turkish state to implement this tax and Turkish
minorities' lack of successful appeal are indicative of the extent to which the
development of a secular state in fact occurred at the expense of religious minorities
as a whole. Prior to collecting the tax, members of various religious communities
offered to pay the tax as a group as was the custom under the Ottoman empire. Prime
Minister Saracoglu refused such a gesture by stating that, unlike the Ottoman Empire,
"we're a [modern] state!"174 Similar references were made to Turkish "national
sovereignty" in determining the form and extent of taxes.175 Thus, although minorities
were subjected as a group to the authority of the state, minorities were unable to
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represent themselves as such. The necessity of the tax was reinforced by a media
campaign (particularly antisemitic in character, though aimed at minorities as a
whole), which largely portrayed grievances as proof of an ungrateful minority
clinging to its privileged Ottoman past and unwilling to live up to its obligations as
citizens of the Turkish state. In a sense, minorities were placed in the precarious
situation of simultaneously being expected to assimilate into the new state's identity as
"secular Turkish," while being unable to because of the perseverance of older forms
of identity in religious terms.
The Multiparty Years and Conclusion
To some extent, the emergence of multiparty politics in Turkey contributed in
a positive way to minorities' relations with the Turkish state. The state's pursuit of
more cautious religious positions after 1945, granted members of the minority
religious communities a greater say in the management of religious sites. For
example, after 1949, the councils managing religious foundations were no longer
appointed by the state but rather elected by the minority community itself. The  final
years of the Republican People's Party rule  and the election of a more Islamically
minded Democratic Party in the 1950s at least initially meant a greater sensitivity
toward religion as a whole. Thus, not only did a United States citizen become
Orthodox Patriarch in 1948,176 but also the appointment of a new Grand Rabbi in
1951 brought new life to the Jewish community (a significant portion of which
continued to immigrate to Israel after 1949).
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Nonetheless, the issue of non-Muslims as "different" has continued to hold
influence. Religious minorities have become especially vulnerable during times of
international crisis or concern, at which point issues of us/ them become especially
apparent. Most notable in this regard was the emergence of the Cyprus question
between Greece and Turkey, which led to the virtual disappearance of the Greek
minority of Istanbul. A riot, which some claim was encouraged by the state,177
attacked the Greek community of Istanbul on the night of 6/7 September 1955.
Seventy three churches, as well as thousands of businesses were vandalized, looted or
destroyed in a single night. 178 In addition to persistent pressures on the Greek
community as a consequence of the Cyprus affair, a final blow was struck in 1964
when between 30 000 and 40 000 "Hellenes" (permanent Istanbul Greek residents
holding Greek-- not Turkish-- passports) were expelled  from Turkey.179 This action,
however, did not only affect Hellenes: the fact that the Hellene population and Greeks
of Turkish citizenship were largely intermarried also had the effect of driving out a
number of Turkish citizens as well. Thus, a population of  300 000 Greeks in the early
1920s has dwindled to about 3 000 today.
Though of a lesser scope, the Greek and Armenian populations have similarly
become targets during times of international crisis. For Turkish Jews, the most
significant issue has concerned the issue of Israel. Despite warm Turkish state
relations with both Israeli and Palestinian authorities, the emergence of a new Islamic-
nationalist conscious in civil society has on occasion entailed an uncomfortable
environment for Turkish Jews.  A significant portion of Necmettin Erbakan's political
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rhetoric involved antisemitic reference.180 Similarly, the foreign Armenian
organization ASALA's  attacks against Turkish diplomats led to the emigration of a
number of Turkish Armenians in the 1980s.
In conclusion,  the development of a Turkish secular identity has proven a
complex legacy for non-Muslim minorities. In essence, the Turkish Ottoman Muslim
millet was transformed into two reinforcing identities. The first was a political
Turkish national identity and the second was formulated as a purely "religious"
Muslim identity. However, the same did not apply for non-Muslims, whose religious
difference also translated into national difference.  In particular, Turkish secularism in
its formative period can be understood as an attempt to consolidate the strength of the
state by bringing non-Muslims under the same authority as Muslims. In effect, state
led programs of Turkification and secularization have not only attempted to diminish
the distinctive elements of Jewish, Armenian, and Greek identity, but  the connotation
of Turk as Muslim has often left non-Muslims vulnerable vis-à-vis the state as evident
in the examples of the Greek-Turkish populations exchanges, the building of a
"national" economy, and the implementation of the Varlik Vergisi. Such programs
have often left minorities in an ironic position: as simultaneously expected to
assimilate, but unable to do so.
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CONCLUSION
The state, I have argued, is inherently related to issues of identity. Far from the
implication of Kenneth Waltz's argument that issues of identity remain a marginal
concern of international relations, I have shown that the development of modern
statehood at the international level has necessarily involved complex consequences at
the domestic level. In particular, becoming a state involves the expectation to behave
like other states by organizing issues of identity in similar form. An important norm
of  post-Westphalian international relations involves the idea  that  religious identity
will not determine the international behavior of states. To put this in other terms,
states are assumed to become "secularized"-- religion is expected to be separated from
the identity of the state and become distinct from politics. The adoption of this norm,
therefore, oftentimes involves the radical reorganization of religion in a given state,
by not only reconstructing religion in terms of modern statehood, but often by
constructing a new religious sphere as something separate from politics.
However, secularization as an international norm governing statehood is far
from an absolute or singular concept and is adopted differently according to the
domestic context of particular  states. The Turkish case provides one interesting
example. The foundations of Turkish secularization largely coincide with efforts to
build a Turkish nation state from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. To a
significant extent, religious and political lines were not clearly defined  in the
Ottoman Empire  in the sense that religious and political communities were
essentially the same (in the form of the various millet that composed the empire).  By
contrast, a prominent feature of the new Turkish state involved the effort to construct
independent spheres of religion and politics, which, separated from each other, would
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nonetheless both be aspects of the state. Both religion and politics were framed in
terms of the state. The new form of religion promulgated by the state became
apolitical in scope and individual in nature. Distinct from politics, the new variety of
Islam was framed in reference to the new Turkish nation state. Ironically, however,
the Turkish state's approach to religion and politics also maintained a certain degree
of continuity with its Ottoman predecessor: despite the new  state's construction of
separated spheres of religion and politics, religion's continued connection to the state
alludes to the perseverance of a single religio-political social order.
It is also important to recognize that ideas of religion and politics will not only
vary from context to context, but will also vary over time within a given context.
Thus, in Turkey, we see that secularization did not retain static form, but continuously
evolved. By the 1950s, societal pressure had caused the Turkish state to reconsider
some of its earlier secularization programs, allowing for a partial narrowing of the
distance separating religion and politics. Thus, despite an occasional military
intervention, Turkish politics and even the state itself had become imprinted with
significant Islamic dimensions. The entrance of Islamic currents into Turkish social
and political life should not be understood as a "reversion" to traditional political
forms, but rather as evidence of a new political form. In these terms,  the notion of
"political Islam"  (or Islamism) is a modern phenomenon by requiring the experience
of modern secular statehood to make sense. Earlier Islamic communities (e.g., the
Ottoman Empire) did not need to qualify Islam as "political" since they did not make
a distinction between notions of religion and politics, but rather encompassed both.
Only when "Islam" has been reconstructed and secularized in form as apolitical, does
"Islam" need to be qualified as "political."
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The adoption of secular statehood, it must also be mentioned, is not simply a
"neutral" process, but often involves profound tension in the state in which it is
introduced.  In the Turkish context, religion's intimate connection to the sociopolitical
order of the Ottoman Empire, was replaced by nationalism as political identity.
However, this reordering of religion as a "private" concern necessarily occurred at the
expense of existing social relations. In particular, the adoption of secularization and
the replacement of religion's "political" function by nationalism involved the
transformation of the Ottoman Muslim millet into the "Turkish nation." Thus,
ironically, Islam became a defining aspect of secular national identity as well.
Conversely, however, non-Muslims resident in Turkey  were often excluded from the
Turkish nation as "non-Turks." The point is that being Muslim or non-Muslim in the
modern Turkish state did not simply transform into a modern "religious" identity (as
"private" and apolitical), but often carried with it "political" overtones. The "religio-
political" framework of Ottoman millet did not easily become simply "religious" in
nature. Likewise, the development of secularization and the modern state did not
simply replace existing identity structures, but were layered upon them.
Throughout this thesis, I have resisted the temptation to define exactly what
religion "is." Some of the reasons for this are outlined in the first chapter, namely:
notions of a universal and private religious sphere largely find their roots in Western
ideas and, therefore, do not always "translate" easily into other contexts. Nonetheless,
as I have shown,  states have often translated religion in the state-building process,
despite the tensions that are involved in doing so.  Thus, rather than understanding
what religion "is," a more fruitful project attempts to understand how religion
continues to change.  To an important extent, this has been a fundamental purpose of
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thesis: to show how religion has developed  and continues to be defined in
relationship to the Turkish state and the tensions that this reconstruction involves.
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